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This Article examines the role obstruction charges play in the regulatory framework covering 
modern public corporations and their members. It finds that prosecutors’ reliance on obstruction 
charges undermines the legitimacy of substantive rules for enterprise behavior. This pattern not 
only causes significant inefficiency on its own, but indicates a broader problem with multilayer 
regulation. That is, in a previously regulated arena, the pre-existing legal environment may warp 
a new set of rules in undesirable ways. The Article concludes by proposing a means to address 
this problem generally and remove unnecessary costs associated with the compliance regime 
specifically. 
By Ilya Podolyako  April 30, 2009 
Multilayer Regulation and Efficiency Costs 
Page 2 of 45 
Table of Contents 
Introduction 4 
I. Criminal and Civil Regulation of Public Companies 8 
 I.A. Delaware State Law 8 
 I.B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2001 9 
 I.C. Federal Securities Law 11 
II. The Role of Criminal Liability in the Corporate Arena 15 
II.A. Corporate Criminal Liability for Particularized Violations 15 
II.B. Obstruction and Alternative Theories of Culpability for Corporate Conduct  17 
II.B.1. Statutory Variants of Obstruction Offenses 17 
II.B.2. Case Studies in the Role of Obstruction Charges in a Corporate Setting 20 
II.C. The Relationship Between Corporate Conduct and Individual Culpability 24 
III. Evaluating the Current Regime 27  
III.A. A Theory of Regulation 27 
III.A.1. Rules, Boundaries, and Parameters 27 
III.A.2. Why Regulate with Boundaries Instead of Parameters? 28 
III.A.3. Second-Order Regulations  29 
III.A.4. Applying the Paradigm to the Real World 33 
III.B. A Methodology for Testing Regulation Through the Multilayer Paradigm 35 
III.B.1. Peeling Onions – Identifying Layers of Regulation in the Real World 35 
IV. Evaluating the Compliance Regime through the Multilayer Paradigm 37 
IV.A. Compliance Requirements Generally as Second-Order Regulation 37 
IV.A.1. Damage Control  37 
By Ilya Podolyako  April 30, 2009 
Multilayer Regulation and Efficiency Costs 
Page 3 of 45 
IV.A.2. Internal Controls – Prevention and Record-Keeping 38 
IV.A.3. Internal Investigations 39 
IV.B. Contextualizing the Impact of Compliance Practices 40 
IV.B.1. A Reasonable Example of a Difficult Decision 40 
IV.B.2. How Compliance Systems Turn the Business Judgment Rule Inside Out 41 
IV.B.3. Enforcement Raids and Fishing Expeditions 42 
IV.C. The Specific Harms of the Compliance Regime 43 
Conclusion 44 
 
By Ilya Podolyako  April 30, 2009 
Multilayer Regulation and Efficiency Costs 




The current financial crisis has led to a widespread public outcry for government action. Lay 
citizens and professional commentators are demanding that their elected leaders do “something” 
to stymie runaway fraud and greed on Wall Street. The collapse of several investment banks and 
extreme volatility in the markets have galvanized into a demand for more, or possibly better, 
regulation. Most specific proposals focus on a narrow subset of economic activities, which is 
unsurprising, given the enormous complexity of developed markets.1 Yet many calls for a move 
towards centralized regulatory control2 share a key deficiency of their narrow counterparts. Both 
types of approaches pitch their prescriptions largely in isolation. Once inserted into the living 
organism of existing law, however, these implants often function in unexpected, detrimental 
ways. This Article will expound on this simple observation in some detail by focusing on the 
compliance framework for corporate activity, an area where multiple layers of regulation 
promulgated at different points in time interact in an unpredictable, costly fashion. After doing 
so, it will propose an ex ante method for identifying and reducing conflict that arises from 
modernizing updates to existing prescriptions.   
In absolute terms, public companies doing business in the United States are already subject to 
plenty of regulation. The federal government began asserting authority over the behavior of 
corporations decades ago.3 The Enron scandal and the accompanying bankruptcies of the late 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., John Coates & David Scharfstein, Lowering the Cost of Bank Recapitalization, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 
(forthcoming 2009); Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison, and Tomasz Piskorski, A New Proposal for Loan 
Modifications, 26 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2009); Alan S. Blinder, Nationalize? Hey, Not So Fast, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 7, 2009, at BU5; Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, To Save the Banks We Must Stand Up to the 
Bankers, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 26, 2009, at 13; John C. Coates & David S. Scharfstein, The Bailout is Robbing 
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at A27; Martin Feldstein, How to Stop the Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J., March 
7, 2008, at A15; Kevin Hassett, New $3 Trillion Bailout Is Coming to the Masses, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 15, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=a.YJmSfnHD9o&refer=columnist_hassett; R. Glenn 
Hubbard & Chris Mayer, First, Let’s Stabilize Home Prices, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2., 2008, at A19.  
2 See, e.g., Ron Scherer, Bernanke’s Plan to Tame Wall Street, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, March 11, 2009, at 25.  
3 See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006); Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (2006); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2006); Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006) (establishing a national minimum wage, mandating overtime pay, and banning 
child labor); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination 
on “the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. sections 9607-
9675 (2006)); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2006); Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), 48 Stat. 
162 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)), partially repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C. (2006)). 
See generally Michael S. Raab, The Transparency Theory: An Alternative Approach to Glass-Steagall Issues, 97 
YALE L.J. 603, 606-07 (1988) (arguing that the Glass-Steagall Act attempted to substantially modify incentives that 
shaped the behavior of commercial banks, as opposed to merely reducing the risk of comingled operations); Edward 
B. Rock, Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1367 (1989) (arguing the federal 
antitrust law should play an important role in the scrutiny of corporate transactions); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s 
Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 616 (2003) (detailing a history of extensive federal involvement in the 
behavior of enterprises); Patrick M. Madden, Note, Federal Labor Law Preemption of State Anti-Takeover Law: A 
Case of First Impression – Air Line Pilots Association, International v. UAL  Corp., 874 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1989), 
65 WASH. L. REV. 457 (1990) (describing the complex relationship between federal labor regulations and state 
corporate law); William C. Tyson, The Proper Relationship Between Federal and State Law in the Regulation of 
Tender Offers, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (1990) (criticizing narrow interpretations of the Williams Act as the 
converse of its original intent to give substantive protections to shareholders subject to tender offers); Cynthia A. 
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1990’s and early 2000’s, however, spurred a wholehearted lunge towards greater regulatory 
control with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.4 
For the first time, positive law dictated how businesses should structure their boards and 
manage their internal decision-making.5 In the wake of SOX, corporate executives bore criminal 
responsibility for misstatements or omissions in key disclosures; accounting practices had to 
follow not only the industry standards but also the rules set out by the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a quasi-public supervisory organ.6  
Sarbanes-Oxley was only part of the regulatory framework, however. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (hereinafter “SEC,” “Commission”) issued reams of rules and releases 
pursuant to its statutory authority to oversee public companies; the Federal Reserve and 
Comptroller of Currency continued to tightly control depository institutions; and state 
legislatures passed “stakeholder” laws protecting local interests.7 Certainly, an insufficient 
number of rules alone cannot be blamed for the ongoing economic turmoil.  
Much has been written about the flaws in the extant regulatory scheme. This Article will not 
attempt to replicate that work. Indeed, many critics have claimed that the misguided substance of 
the structure, not its size, was to blame for the various detrimental outcomes, including the 
financial collapse. These positions merit attention, but will not be the focus here. Rather, this 
Article will attempt to articulate an optimal regulatory posture for a government trying to 
minimize certain negative corporate behaviors with limited resources.  
To this end, the present work will evaluate the theory of regulation and how well that theory 
agrees with the actual practice of the responsible agents. As such, the goal will be to analyze 
method, not substance. One observation will help bring the thesis of this Article into focus. 
Despite the rapid proliferation of substantive rules for corporate conduct over the past decade 
and a half, a large fraction of successful federal prosecutions for executives have not centered on 
their violations. While in the 1980’s Rudy Giuliani made his name by aggressively going after 
individuals and companies deemed to have breached the prohibition of material omissions and 
misstatements in §10 of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5,8 by 19989 the pattern 
                                                                                                                                                             
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 
1206, 1237-38 (1999) (arguing that the SEC has broad statutory authority to protect shareholders and the public 
interest).  
4 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).  
5 See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353 (2004).  
6 See SOX § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006); Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, http://www.pcaobus.org/, 
last visited March 16, 2009); see also Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667 
(D.C. Cir. 2008); David S. Hilzenrath, Sarbanes-Oxley Upheld By Court as Constitutional, WASH. POST, August 23, 
2008, at D01 (describing the constitutional challenge to the PCAOB claiming that the entity violates the separation 
of powers principle).  
7 The precise form and goals of these statutes vary. The majority of states that have adopted such legislation permit 
directors to consider the interests of parties other than the shareholders when making decisions. Connecticut and 
Arizona, by contrast, have adopted a stronger version of the policy that requires directors to consider such outside 
interests. See A.R.S. § 10-1202 (2008); RISKMETRICS, 2008 U.S. PROXY VOTING MANUAL, at Ch. 6 (2008), 
available at http://www.issueatlas.com/content/free/content/menutop/content/subscription/usvmfiles/x6816.html. 
Connecticut mandates that directors consider “the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, creditors and 
suppliers[;] and . . .  community and societal considerations including those of any community in which any office 
or other facility of the corporation is located” when discharging their duties. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-756 (2008).  
8 Though Giuliani charged defendants like Michael Milken with violations of § 10, most plead guilty to a 13(d) 
offense that did not give rise to private rights of action for material misstatements. See generally DANIEL FISCHEL, 
PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 98-102 (1996).  
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fell out of favor. Instead, in most high-profile cases, the prosecution reached favorable results 
when the defendants either plead guilty or were convicted of a crime did so for some variant of 
obstructing justice.10    
This observation is rather puzzling. Rules become meaningless if nobody cares to enforce 
them or observe the violations. At best, they transform into heuristics, rough suggestions for 
what one may or may not do. So, if a prosecutor charges a defendant with obstruction every time 
the latter violates a provision of Sarbanes-Oxley, the obstruction category subsumes any 
substantive prescriptions of the statute. Simultaneously, concepts of justice and the rule of law 
demand that the acts that are punished carry some logical similarity that allows a citizen to 
identify prohibited behavior and the accompanying punishment ex ante. When certain business 
decisions count as a breach of positive requirements while others fall into a catchall category, 
executives are bound to get confused.  
The lack of clarity here is not merely a concern for the well-being of the potential 
perpetrators. The regulations that currently cover public companies purport to be a guide to 
model behavior, not just an electric fence that will shock anyone who comes close with a 
forbidden boundary. Corporations are very diverse, both in business and in internal structure. No 
code could possibly describe the legality of all actions that take place within all companies. 
Instead, legislation and accompanying administrative pronouncements aim to articulate key 
principles for how corporation should behave. The drafters and jurists then hope that employees 
at all levels will internalize these axioms and use them to determine appropriate behavior in 
ordinary and novel situations alike. 
The doctrine of disclosure is a good example of this approach. The Securities and Exchange 
Acts generally require companies to release all material information to the public at large. 
Judicial interpretation of this tenet has led to the development of the fraud on the markets 
theory,11 an expansion of section 10(b) to cover insider trading,12 and a restriction on aiding and 
abetting liability in securities cases, inter alia.13 Judicial decisions and administrative 
pronouncements elaborating on these areas usually reference the concept of disclosure as a 
foundation of their conclusion.  
At the same time, it is not the case that companies subject to the Exchange Act must report 
all information. The disclosure requirement is bounded by materiality provisions, causation 
constraints, and duty elements. Each of these considerations acts as a countervailing force that 
helps shape the actual doctrine of securities regulation and its rule-based implementation. A 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 See, e.g., WAYNE BARRETT, RUDY!: AN INVESTIGATIVE BIOGRAPHY OF RUDY GIULIANI 157-60 (2001); Steven K. 
Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 
41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 808 (2000); J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: Reflections on Michael, 
Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45 (2007).  
10 See After 4 Years, Last Charges Dropped in Quattrone Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/30/business/30banker.html?_r=1&oref=slogin; Quattrone is Indicted on 
Obstruction-of-Justice Charges, THESTREET.COM, May 12, 2003, 
http://www.thestreet.com/markets/marketfeatures/10086664.html; “Short-Cuts” – Obstruction of Justice, White 
Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://www.typepad.com/t/trackback/89778/24959622 (last visited Dec. 8, 2008) 
(“Obstruction of justice, perjury, and false statements prove particularly easy charges for the government when the 
conduct would require extensive investigation prior to indictment. I often call them the government “short-cut” 
offenses.  So it is no surprise to see the government using them extensively.”).   
11 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
12 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see also Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 653-654, 
657-59 (1983). 
13 Cent. Bank of Denver, N. A., v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
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manager at IBM does not have to check back to first principles of corporate governance to go 
through her daily agenda. She can rely on employee manuals, managerial training, and 
instructions from company executives and lawyers. Nonetheless, when the available authorities 
fail to provide a definitive answer, a decision deferring to first principles will likely be better 
than one ignorant of them. So, if said manager is contemplating whether or not to notify the 
Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) that a manufacturing facility in Malaysia has found a defect in 
one of the three machines necessary for fabricating a microchip a week before the quarterly 
reporting deadline comes up, the tenet of disclosure would urge her to provide a detailed account 
of the issue to her superiors.  
Suppose that the aforementioned COO discusses the manufacturing problem with the 
manager but decides to withhold it from the quarterly report until he has an opportunity to unload 
some of his stock in the company. A few months later, with the stock plunging, the SEC 
launches an investigation into suspicious sales and passes on data about the COO’s behavior to 
the U.S. Attorney’s office. If the latter decides to press charges for insider trading, he will 
reinforce the primacy of the disclosure principle as a conduct rule. The case will send a message: 
in situations like the one faced by the COO, the appropriate decision is to include information in 
the quarterly report.  
By contrast, if the prosecutor chooses to pursue the defendant for an offense unrelated to 
business ethics, such as obstruction, rational observers will focus on the behavior following the 
actual transgression as a trigger for the punishment. They may not realize what corporate 
decision led to the criminal case. The demographic that should be paying closest attention to the 
proceedings will not be able to receive any clear signal on whether the lack of disclosure forms 
legitimate grounds for culpability. Moreover, in the absence of a trial, the prosecution’s theory of 
the case will remain at least partially secret, making it difficult for managers to understand the 
application of the existing fact pattern and future situations. 
It is important to note that this Article’s concerns about the desirability of the aforementioned 
scenario do not center on the presence of prosecutorial discretion. This element of the American 
legal system has already received due coverage by other authors. 14 While it certainly plays a part 
in bringing about a scenario the remainder of this piece will argue to be undesirable, it is by no 
means the chief culprit. Indeed, the power of prosecutors to unilaterally threaten severe charges 
in high-profile cases could be the best way to police an enormous market apparatus with finite 
government resources. The resulting loss of shareholder value15 and vague standards for 
corporate conduct would then be the fair price of orderly business.   
This Article will argue, however, that a confluence of factors has increased these costs 
without providing a proportional benefit to society. It will attempt to articulate a method through 
which the United States can make any democratically determined set of guidelines for corporate 
behavior more robust, more transparent, and more efficient. This argument will proceed in four 
parts.  Part I will briefly describe the substantive laws applicable to corporate behavior, lay out 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1986) (demanding “exceptionally clear proof” in order to find 
that a prosecutor abused his discretion in a discriminatory fashion); Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: 
The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553 (1999) (discussing the broad 
scope of discretionary powers allotted to prosecutors); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981).  
15 See Edward B. Diskant, Note, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American 
Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 141 (2008); see generally Pamela H. 
Bucy, Why Punish? Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1287 (2007) (providing 
examples of the impact of corporate scandals on stock price).  
By Ilya Podolyako  April 30, 2009 
Multilayer Regulation and Efficiency Costs 
Page 8 of 45 
compliance demands placed on businesses, and outline the statutes used for prosecuting 
obstruction. Part II will discuss several case studies highlighting the interaction between conduct 
rules, compliance requirements, obstruction, and other enforcement tactics. Part III will discuss 
the goals of corporate regulation broadly. It will then attempt to sketch out a test that would 
permit one to craft and detect both optimal and suboptimal enforcement postures. Part IV will 
apply this test to the current state of affairs and make recommendations on any necessary course 
corrections. The Article will conclude by integrating the solution to the problem of compliance 
costs with broader recommendations derived from the multilayer regulation paradigm. 
 
Part I. Criminal and Civil Regulation of Public Companies 
 
 I.A. Delaware State Law 
 
While this Article will deal primarily with federal regulation of publicly traded companies, 
traditionally, the majority of legal constraints on these entities’ behavior came from their state of 
incorporation.16 For a variety of reasons,17 Delaware has long held the title of the most popular 
originating jurisdiction in the United States, hosting over 50% of companies listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) or NASDAQ.18 This Part will briefly review the key state-level 
doctrines to enable the reader to carry out a more detailed comparative analysis later on in the 
Article.  
Delaware General Corporate Law sets out three primary responsibilities for corporate 
officers and directors. The duty of loyalty requires them to avoid situations that stand in the way 
of the shareholders’ profit-making interest.19 The duty of care requires that directors and officers 
act diligently and on an informed basis when they carry out their responsibilities to the 
company.20 Finally, the duty of good faith resides in the continuum between the two and 
stipulates that persons cannot act loyally towards a company unless they “act[] in the good faith 
belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.”21  
Generally, as long as a board is informed of material facts that are reasonably available, it 
can claim the benefit of the “business judgment rule,” which assumes the directors’ decisions to 
                                                 
16 Though some publicly traded partnerships exist (e.g., Real Estate Investment Trusts, the Blackstone Group, see 
Ryan J. Donmoyer, Blackstone Says IPO Tax Stance May Prompt IRS Action, BLOOMBERG.COM, March 29, 2007, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aaPFVuozAq8E), they are rare and come about 
primarily due to tax considerations for the main earning stream. This Article will focus on corporations exclusively.   
17 See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).  
18 About Agency, Department of State: Division of Corporations, State of Delaware: The Official Website for the 
First State, http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Dec. 8, 2008).   
19 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 144 (2008); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996); 
Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).   
20 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (2008) (“a director has a duty “to act in an informed and deliberate manner in 
determining whether to approve an agreement of merger before submitting the proposal to the stockholders.”); see, 
e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
21 Guttman v. Jen-Hsun Huang, 832 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 
(Del. 2006) (“[I[t follows that because a showing of bad faith conduct, in the sense described in Disney and 
Caremark, is essential to establish director oversight liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty 
of loyalty.”). Whereas a violation of either the duties of care or loyalty necessarily lead to director liability in the 
absence of specific carve-outs in the corporate charter, a beach of the duty of good faith does not always do so. See 
also In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that corporate directors did not 
necessarily have the best interests of the company in mind when they approved the CEO’s options package and 
disposition schedule).  
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be correct.22  To succeed in court against the application of the business judgment rule, plaintiffs 
must prove irrationality or a breach of one of the aforementioned duties. If the business judgment 
rule does not apply, corporate actors may have to defend the “entire fairness” of a transaction.23  
Delaware corporate law also vigorously protects the shareholder franchise.24 Shareholders 
retain rights to access corporate records with proper purpose, as long as they do not unduly 
interfere with the company’s business.25 Finally, the combination of statutory duties and case law 
imposes specific restrictions on the behavior of directors and officers in the context of mergers, 
where they generally must take reasonable efforts to maximize value returned to the 
shareholders.26  
 
 I.B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2001 
 
The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2001 (“SOX”) in the wake of the Enron collapse 
significantly altered the playing field for corporate regulation. Previously, business matters were 
governed primarily by state law, as described above. The new statute massively expanded federal 
reach in this area. Passed by a 99-0 vote after a series of high-profile bankruptcies (Adelphia, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, etc.), SOX included many of the popular proposals that had been 
floating around the public domain. 27  
Its main focus fell on regulating the auditing function. To this end, Section 102 of the Act 
required all accounting companies that represented public companies to register with a new 
body, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.28 In an effort to minimize conflicts of 
interest and improve the precision with which financial statements reflected the state of the 
enterprise, said registered accounting firms were prohibited from providing consulting or book-
keeping (they could still provide tax advice).29 At least two partners had to sign off on any public 
company audit; the main audit partner had to be rotated every five years. PCAOB had the ability 
                                                 
22 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).  
23 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 
1156 (Del. 1995).   
24 See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The shareholder franchise is the 
ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests. Generally, shareholders have only 
two protections against perceived inadequate business performance. They may sell their stock (which, if done in 
sufficient numbers, may so affect security prices as to create an incentive for altered managerial performance), or 
they may vote to replae incumbent board members.”); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 
953-54 (Del. 1985) (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964)) (permitting selective treatment of a hostile 
shareholder to combat strategic threat to company)). 
25 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2008).  
26 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) (specifying that in the 
face of an imminent takeover, the directors have a duty to maximize company value); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. 
QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (“In the sale of control context, the directors must focus on one 
primary objective – to secure the transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders – and 
they must exercise their fiduciary duties to further that end.”). 
27 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 
1521, 1527-30 (2005); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Essay, Regulation or Scholarship: Constant 
Companions or Occasional Bedfellows?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 111 (2009); United States Senate, U.S. Senate Roll 
Call Votes 107th Congress – 2nd Session, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote=0019
2 (last visited March 16, 2008).  
28 107 P.L. 204, Title I, § 102, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7212 (2006)).  
29 SOX § 201, 107 P.L. 204, Title I, § 102, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2006)).   
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to pass additional regulations, inspect accounting firms, and sanction ones that did not comply. 
Overall, the entity was charged with enforcing the standards promulgated by the official 
accounting conference, the FASB.  
Other provisions of SOX were even more significant. The law required CEOs and CFOs to 
certify the accuracy of the audit reports and the resulting financial statements. The statute 
simultaneously mandated that each public company must establish an audit committee comprised 
entirely of independent directors.30 This organ would have exclusive power to determine the 
scope of the annual audit before it began and implement any changes thereafter. It had the power 
to review recommendations of accounting treatment by the auditor. The latter also had to report 
all material written communications between themselves and company management to the 
committee. The audit committee had final say in all matters under its control. Thus, it could 
override the objections of the CEO or the CFO while still requiring them to sign off on the 
committee’s preferred version of the financial statements. It is worth reiterating that executives 
faced criminal punishment for certifying reports that did not fairly present the condition of the 
issuer.31 The committee could, and, under some situations, had to hire independent counsel for 
any issues arising from its work.  
 A final set of noteworthy provisions addressed disclosure requirements. Auditors had to 
sign off on financial information before it could be released to investors. A covered company had 
a responsibility to rapidly report material changes in its economic situation.32 The statute gave 
the Securities and Exchange Commission authority to require disclosure of all off-balance sheet 
transactions and obligations.33 Crucially, SOX also demanded the companies create large internal 
compliance systems. These structures were supposed to detect violations of applicable laws early 
                                                 
30 SOX defined “independent directors” as individuals who did not receive monetary compensation from the 
company for service in any capacity other than on the audit committee itself. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(b) (2006). 
31 See SOX § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).  
32 SOX § 409, 107 P.L. 204, Title IV, § 409, 116 Stat. 745, amended 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006) to read:  
Real Time Issuer Disclosures. – Each issuer reporting under section 13(a) or 15(d) [of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934] shall disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis such 
additional information concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the 
issuer, in plain English, which may include trend and qualitative information and graphic 
presentations, as the Commission determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection of 
investors and in the public interest.  
Securities law in general does not favor a duty to correct information already released into the public sphere. Rather, 
a company is responsible for making correct disclosures at one point in time and then changing to comply with 
ongoing developments only during future releases. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., Inc. 269 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 
2001) (“We do not have a system of continuous disclosure. Instead firms are entitled to keep silent (about good 
news as well as bad news) unless positive law creates a duty to disclose. . . . Judges have no authority to scoop the 
political branches and adopt continuous disclosure under the banner of Rule 10b-5. Especially not under that banner, 
for Rule 10b-5 condemns only fraud, and a corporation does not commit fraud by standing on its rights under a 
periodic-disclosure system.”). The opinion went to state that section 13 of Securities Exchange Act requires periodic 
reports, with emphasis on periodic: the regulations ‘contemplated that these reports will be snapshots of the 
corporation’s status on or near the filing date, with updates due not when something “material” happens, but on the 
next prescribed filing date.’ 269 F.3d at 809; compare with Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 
F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that under Securities Act § 10(a), the company had a duty to amend a prospectus 
that had become misleading due to post-registration developments before it could carry on its offering). For a 
discussion of the relationship between the duty to correct and the duty to update, see generally, Donald C. 
Langevoort, Half-truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences By Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1999). 
33 SOX § 401(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (2006).  
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on and prevent them from replicating. Executives and auditors both had to certify the adequacy 
of such compliance measures.34 
The legal academy has developed a rare consensus the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposed 
significant costs on operating a business as a public company in the United States. Several 
scholars have described the detrimental effects of this legislation in particularly strong terms.35 
This Article will not rehash their ideas. Instead, it will critique SOX compliance requirements as 
a component of an inefficient, multilayer regulatory regime in Part V. For now, though, the 
reader should take the statute at face value as the source of numerous new rules that expand 
federal control over corporate governance.  
 
I.C. Federal Securities Law.  
 
  Traditionally, securities laws provided the basis for federal regulation of public 
companies. The structure rested on two pillars, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Roughly speaking, these statutes stood for the principles of registration 
(’33 Act) and reporting (’34 Act). The first member of the duo outlined a class of instruments 
called securities36 and prohibited the sale of these without a prospectus that would describe their 
key characteristics37 unless the security would qualify for a specific exception.38 The statute 
established the Securities and Exchange Commission, an independent, non-partisan 
administrative agency, to enforce its provisions.  
 The 1934 Exchange Act supplemented its predecessor by requiring certain companies to 
continuously disclose their financial conditions. That is, businesses that either listed their shares 
on a national exchange,39 had assets greater than $10 million and a class of securities held by at 
least 500 people,40 or filed a ’33 Act registration statement had to supplement the information in 
their prospectus with regular reports. These documents include Form 10K’s for annual disclosure 
(the point of contact for most SOX reporting provisions), 10Q’s for more limited quarterly 
disclosure, and Form 8K’s for material developments. The Exchange Act also included rules for 
soliciting shareholder proxies.41 The Williams Act later amended several of these provisions to 
more closely regulate tender offers. Finally, the ’34 statute contained sections that required a 
narrowly defined group of corporate insiders to disgorge profits made from trading company 
stock during a 6 month period.42  
Regulatory pronouncements abut federal statutory requirements for corporate conduct 
stemming from the Securities and Exchange Acts. The SEC gains its rule-making power from 
several sources. One of the most potent is Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the so-called “antifraud 
provision,” which authorizes the Commission to prescribe rules and regulations to prevent the 
                                                 
34 SOX § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006). 
35 See Romano, supra note 27. 
36 Securities Act § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).  
37 Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).  
38 Securities Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2006).  
39 Securities Exchange Act § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b) (2006).  
40 Securities Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2008). 
41 Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006). 
42 Securities Exchange Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006). Modern insider trading jurisprudence has moved away 
from Securities Exchange Act § 16 towards the more expansive scope of §10 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78j (2006), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). See Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 
U.S. 646 (1983).  
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use of manipulative devices or contrivances in connection to the purchase or sale of any security 
on a national exchange.43 Additionally, pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Exchange Act, the SEC 
has the power to “alter, supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or restrictions with respect 
to any matter or action subject to regulation by the Commission or a self-regulatory organization 
. . . as the Commission determines is necessary in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors.“44 Sections 645 and 19(a)46 of the Exchange Act grant the SEC power to register 
national securities exchanges and other self-regulating organizations (SROs)47 that meet such 
requirements as the Commission deems necessary.48 The Williams Act amendments covering 
tender offers also permit the Commission to promulgate the rules necessary for the protection of 
investors.49  
The above sources of authority are only a sample of the many statutory provisions 
permitting the SEC to set out rules as it sees fit. The aforementioned sections do, however, 
underpin the regulations that play the most significant roles in shaping the day-to-day activities 
of a business.  
Regulation FD (“Fair Disclosure”) provides a good example. It is relatively narrow in 
scope but powerful, providing that “when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses 
material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities” to certain enumerated 
persons (in general, securities market professionals and holders of the issuer's securities who 
may well trade on the basis of the information), it “shall make public disclosure of that 
information . . . .”50 A public release via Form 8K and appropriate mass media outlets must 
follow “promptly” after any accidental disclosure.51 The regulation was originally motivated by 
                                                 
43 Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).  
44 Securities Exchange Act § 12(k)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(k)(2) (2006). The Commission recently invoked these powers 
to first ban “abusive naked short-selling,” see Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange 
Act Release No. 58,166 (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58166.pdf; 
Amendment to Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58,190 (July 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58190.pdf, and then to implement an unprecedented ban on all short sales. 
See Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,592 (Sept. 18, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58592.pdf. The fact that the SEC could literally cleave the 
equity markets in half with an administrative order (albeit with overwhelming popular support) highlights its broad 
regulatory mandate.  
45 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (2006). 
46 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (2006).  
47 SROs are generally governed by Exchange Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(d) (2006), with other statutory provisions 
adding specific oversight and responsibilities as described elsewhere in this Article.  
48 Specifically, the SEC may not register an organization unless it determines that it, inter alia, has appropriate 
disciplinary tools in place and has established “rules of the exchange [that] are designed to prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and 
coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and 
facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open 
market and a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest . . . .” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78f(b)(5)-(9) (2008). The Commission may also require every national securities exchange or registered SRO to 
disseminate any reports that are necessary or appropriate to the public interest or the protection of investors. 15 
U.S.C. § 78(q) (2008).  
49 See Securities Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (2006). The Commission has exercised several 
rules defining unlawful tender offer practices, SEC Rule 14d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (2008), and prohibiting 
certain abusive transactions.  
50 Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2008); see also Elec. Data Sys. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 43,154 
(Sept. 25, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56519.pdf.  
51 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) (2008)  
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concerns that corporate insiders were tipping certain parties to allow them to make money by 
anticipating market movements in the stock.52 Moreover, the SEC wanted to prevent executives 
from currying favor with sell-side analysts by giving them exclusive peeks at confidential firm 
information in exchange for favorable grades of the company’s shares.53 Notably, this regulation 
only applies to communications with market professionals who may reasonably trade on the 
disclosed information and does not offer grounds for civil liability.54 Despite the narrow aim at 
traditional disclosure concerns, Reg FD has profoundly changed the way public companies carry 
out analyst conference calls and operate in capital markets.55 
 Reg SHO56 is a second example of powerful SEC regulations that take full advantage of 
the expansive scope of the authorizing statutes. It was originally used to implement the uptick 
rule and has recently been supplemented by SEC pronouncements banning “naked” short sales 
and temporarily suspending their fully-clothed brethren.57 Similarly, Regulation SX has had an 
enormous impact on corporate governance by implementing the provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act described in Part I.B above.58  
Regulation M-A is also quite significant. This document requires any “going-private” 
transaction59 to list the purposes, alternatives, reasons and effects of said transactions.60 Involved 
parties must disclose the source of funds for the deal,61 itemize incurred expenses,62 describe any 
repayment plan for borrowing,63 and report any parties that the issuer retained to promote the 
transaction.64 Finally, the Regulation asks subject companies to explain whether the transaction 
is “fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders”65 and “state whether or not the Rule 13e-3 
transaction was approved by a majority of the directors of the subject company who are not 
employees of the subject company.”66 Determinations of fairness should revolve among factors 
such as market prices for the securities (current and historical), enterprise value determinations 
(based on net book, going concern, and liquidation principles), and outstanding “firm offers” for 
the company by unaffiliated persons.67 
                                                 
52 Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 
51.716 (Aug. 15, 2000). 
53 “Regulation FD is also designed to address another threat to the integrity of our markets: the potential for 
corporate management to treat material information as a commodity to be used to gain or maintain favor with 
particular analysts or investors.” 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716.   
54 See 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718 – 51,719.  
55 See Stephen E. Bochner & Samir Bukhari, The Duty to Update and Disclosure Reform: The Impact of Regulation 
FD and Current Disclosure Initiatives, 7 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 225, 237 (2002). 
56 17 C.F.R. § 242 (2008).  
57 See supra note 43.   
58 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2008).  
59 Defined in Securities Exchange Act Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2008), to cover any transaction that 
involves the purchase or tender for an equity security by its issuer and has the effect of limiting the class of persons 
holding said security to 300 or delisting it from a national exchange.  
60 17 C.F.R. § 229.1013 (2008).  
61 17 C.F.R. § 229.1007(a) (2008).  
62 Id. at § 229.1007(c) 
63 Id. at § 229.1007(d)(2).  
64 17 C.F.R. § 229.1009 (2008). 
65 Defined in Rule 13e-3 by exclusion as anyone who is not “a person that directly or indirectly through one or more 
intermediaries controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with such issuer.” 17 C.F.R. §§  240.13e-
3(a)(1), 13e-3(a)(4) (2008).   
66 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014(e) (2008).  
67 Instructions to Item 1014, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014 (2008). The Instructions also provide that ‘conclusory statements, 
such as “The Rule 13e-3 transactions is fair to unaffiliated security holders in relation to net book value, going 
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While Reg M-A has not gathered as much attention from commentators as S-X, FD, or 
SHO, it is unique in imposing a federal mandate for fairness certification on transactions. To be 
clear, the inquiry is not a recent innovation – Delaware courts have long relied on a similar 
approach to determine whether to invalidate transactions where management violated its duties 
of care or loyalty. 68 The SEC’s version is simply another federal outpost on corporate 
governance grounds traditionally controlled by the state.69  
The gradual usurpation of regulatory turf is not the only notable characteristic of Reg M-
A. The rule exists as an elaboration of affirmative reporting duties under federal law: subject 
firms must release the required fairness analysis to the public. These disclosures take place in the 
shadow of the same norms of civil and criminal liability for material misstatements and 
omissions applicable elsewhere in securities regulation. Reg M-A thus adds a complicating gloss 
to the state fairness inquiry prototype. That is, even if a finding that management complied with 
their duties and deserves the deference of the business judgment rule precludes a Delaware court 
from reaching the fairness inquiry,70 Reg M-A permits investors to claim in a federal suit that 
they were mislead by overly optimistic evaluations of the transaction at hand. Moreover, by 
setting out the factors that should shape a 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014 determination and any 
administrative scrutiny thereof, the SEC gained power to shape the behavior of managers 
contemplating any triggering transaction ex ante. 
That is, suppose Fund A is considering taking Company B private within the boundaries 
of Rule 13e-3. Officers of B must then certify that, based on comparisons of enterprise value and 
available deal options, such a transaction would be fair to unaffiliated shareholders. This is true 
even where state law in the location of incorporation would permit a streamlined freeze-out 
conversion. If Fund A found a bargain (a company trading below its projected liquidation value) 
and secured it by offering half of the expected profit to the shareholders as a premium over the 
market stock price, Reg M-A still has the power to prevent the purchasers from carrying out this 
Pareto-beneficial plan. Unless new management can honestly state that outside shareholders will 
capture a fair share of assets unlocked through liquidation, they would be liable under § 10 of the 
Securities Exchange Act for making a materially misleading statement in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security. The need to avoid this scenario can shape internal prognosis and 
book-keeping mechanisms by favoring overly conservative analysis. 
While this Part shows the breadth of the SEC’s power to regulate the activities of public 
companies, the agency’s reach has certain limits. At various points in recent history, courts have 
successfully curtailed the Commission’s domain. For example, in Business Roundtable v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission,71 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held that neither the Securities and Exchange Acts nor their subsequent amendments 
                                                                                                                                                             
concern value and future prospects of the issuer” will not be considered sufficient disclosure in response to 
paragraph (b) of this section.’ Id.  
68 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See generally Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 
55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557 (2006).  
69 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Modern Federalism Issues and American Business: The 
Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (2006); Loewenstein, supra note 5, at 
353. 
70 See Loewenstein, supra, at 377 (“[T]he business judgment rule . . . limits the potential liability of a director for 
breaches of the duty of care. A director is only liable if he or she is grossly negligent, and the rule presumes that the 
director acted with due care. Thus, a shareholder challenging director conduct bears the burden of proving that the 
director acted with gross negligence.”). 
71 905 F.2d 406 (1990).  
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permitted the SEC to prohibit shares with fractional votes when these instruments were approved 
by the issuer’s board of directors. The court felt that such interference in the affairs of a 
corporation, a creature of state law, was impermissible absent specific legislative authorization. 
The judges were unable to find any hint of such authorization in the record, declaring instead that 
“Congress made clear that the power to regulate central information processing was not intended 
to give the SEC ‘either the responsibility or the power to operate as an 'economic czar.’”72  
Of course, the appeal of limited federal regulation fluctuates with the political climate. 
The scandals of the dot-com collapse cast a harsh light on the Commission’s hands-off strategy 
under Commissioner Harvey Pitt, with the public clamoring for greater oversight of corporate 
behavior.73 Moreover, sweeping legislative products like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may have 
eroded legitimate grounds for judicial skepticism over Congress’s intended delegation of power 
to the SEC. Finally, the widespread demand for greater regulation, coupled with unprecedented 
activity by the Federal Reserve and the Department of Treasury to avert catastrophic market 
collapse in the fall of 2008 and winter of 2009 further undermined the vitality of rigid deference 
to state control over corporations. Without these ideological underpinnings, the borders of 
appropriate action by the SEC have become blurred. 
 
Part II. The Role of Criminal Liability in the Corporate Arena. 
 
II.A. Corporate Criminal Liability for Particularized Violations 
 
 The aforementioned statutes and regulations do not have the corporate law arena to 
themselves. They share it with some sharp-toothed species originating elsewhere in the law. 
Transplants from Title 18 of the United States Code are particularly prominent. While various 
agencies can bring civil suits for breaches of duty and criminal prosecutions for intentional 
violation of securities laws,74 much of the enforcement measures that shape the legal 
environment for a business rely on theories of liability that lack any specific historic attachment 
to the regulation of economic activity.75  
 A proper survey of these tools has to begin with some simple principles. First, for over 
one hundred years, the common law has viewed corporations as entities capable of criminal 
conduct.76 Such culpability generally requires a particular mental state, which, to a lay person, 
                                                 
72 Id. at 416.  
73 See, e.g., John McCain, The Free Market Needs New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at A19.  
74 See Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2006) (providing criminal culpability for all those who “willfully and 
knowingly” violate the provisions and accompanying rules); Securities Exchange Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2006) 
(providing criminal culpability for all those who “willfully and knowingly” violate the provisions and accompanying 
rules). 
75 Diskant, supra note 15, at 137 (“[T]he drive toward entity criminal liability stemmed primarily from the efforts of 
American prosecutors who creatively and aggressively applied statutory and common law and from the early 
American courts that allowed them to do so.”).  
76 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909) (‘“We think that a 
corporation may be liable criminally for certain offenses of which a specific intent may be a necessary element.  
There is no more difficulty in imputing to a corporation a specific intent in criminal proceedings than in civil. A 
corporation cannot be arrested and imprisoned in either civil or criminal proceedings, but its property may be taken 
either as compensation for a private wrong or as punishment for a public wrong.”’); see also United States v. Wise, 
370 U.S. 405 (1962) (finding that the Sherman Act definition of “person” applies both to corporations and to 
individuals acting as corporate agents). 
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may be difficult to find in a fictional person made up of charters and contracts. American legal 
thinkers, however, did not see much of a problem here, arguing that  
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in holding that 
the act of the agent, while exercising the authority delegated to him to make rates for 
transportation, may be controlled, in the interest of public policy, by imputing his act to 
his employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting in the 
premises.77  
The same principles applied to inculpate partnerships.78 Moreover, since the interests of a 
corporation were those of its shareholders, the law enabled the entity to assert defenses and 
rationales distinct from its employees.79 At present, criminal statutes of the United States apply 
equally to natural persons and corporations, unless otherwise specified.80 
 As previously mentioned, intentional violations of substantive federal regulations for 
corporate behavior all carry criminal penalties,81 though specific mental state requirements for 
guilt vary by statute. Much like elsewhere in criminal law, some of these distinctions have a 
meaningful impact on the application of the provisions in question, while others don’t. For 
example, while the Securities and Exchange Acts themselves provide culpability for all “willful” 
contraventions, other applicable laws take a more nuanced approach. Thus, a provision of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act sets out penalties of up to 25 years’ imprisonment for knowing execution of 
schemes or artifices to defraud and use of fraudulent pretenses to obtain money or property in 
connection with registered securities.82 By comparison, 18 U.S.C. § 1341,83 a statute that 
criminalizes mail fraud imposes punishment on anyone who uses the U.S. Mail or private 
interstate carriers for the purpose of distributing a security for unlawful use.84  
It is worth noting that the classification of enforcement measures into criminal and civil 
categories is somewhat less informative for corporations than it is for individuals. As Justice Day 
                                                 
77 212 U.S. at 494.  
78 United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958) (holding that Congress has the power to make 
partnerships criminally liable for violation of statutory safety provisions despite their lack of independent legal 
identity and that difficulties in attributing mens rea to a partnership are no greater than doing the same to a 
corporation).  
79 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (indicating that a corporation has an interest in 
asserting a criminal defense that is distinct from the interests of its employees); see also John Braithwaite & Brent 
Fisse, On the Plausibility of Corporate Crime Control, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY 
VIEWS 432-49 (Gilbert Geis et al. eds., 3d ed. 1995) (discussing the ability of corporations to form intentions that 
are separate from those of their employees). 
80 See Rules of Construction Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless 
the context indicates otherwise – . . .  the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals . . . .”). 
81 See supra note 71.  
82 SOX § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006). 
 Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice . . .  
(1) to defraud any person in connection with any security of an issuer with a class of securities registered 
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or that is required to file reports under section 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; or  
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or 
property in connection with the purchase or sale of any security of an issuer with a class of securities 
registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or that is required to file reports under 
section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;  
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both. 
83 (2006).  
84 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
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pointed out in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad, corporations face largely identical 
penalties for both kinds of violations (relinquishing property, agreeing to restrict future conduct). 
Furthermore, the complexity of suspected enterprise misconduct necessitates cooperation 
between civil and criminal authorities in most investigations.85 Thus, the decision for who will 
actually go to court against the accused comes after most of the pertinent information about 
conduct has been gathered.86 By contrast, a plaintiff cannot hand off a suit against a natural 
person to a prosecutor, and the prosecutor cannot usually decide to drop charges against a 
defendant to permit a civil entity to pursue a less serious violation.  
Many white collar criminal prosecutions follow an even more complex pathway. The first 
hint of wrongdoing will often come from a private party, be it a reporting company following the 
requirements of SOX, external counsel, or an anonymous tip. Alternatively, a self-regulated, 
quasi-official entity like the New York Stock Exchange will spot suspicious behavior and initiate 
an investigation. If one of these bodies determines that serious misconduct took place, they will 
refer it to the appropriate civil or criminal authorities. One of the interesting consequences of this 
layered mechanism is that organs of the U.S. government spend a lot less time evaluating weak 
cases then they would in other legal arenas. This setup is intentional: it permits a small number 
of people with limited resources to regulate an enormous economy. Later parts of this Article 
will discuss certain consequences of this approach in more detail. For now, the reader will 
suffice to keep the peculiar track of many enforcement measures in the corporate arena in mind.  
 
II.B. Obstruction and Alternative Theories of Culpability for Corporate Conduct  
 
The sources of criminal culpability for businesses, their agents, and employees described 
in the previous subpart fit in well with archetypal criminal law doctrine. Behavior that 
contravenes norms set out by statute is deemed a violation worthy of sanction. Given some basic 
legal knowledge, the norms themselves appear fairly intuitive, if somewhat harsh – anything that 
looks like fraud or intentional misrepresentation is prohibited. To this end, the actus reus element 
of the criminal offenses is tangible and robust. Likewise, civil liability usually flows out of 
similar misconduct that lacks the necessary state of mind. Of course, this is a highly idealized 
description, but its goal is not to provide an exhaustive, brightline definition. Rather, it functions 
as all labels do, by identifying salient characteristics of a group of items that aid classification of 
further items.  
 This subpart will describe frequent sources of criminal liability for corporate actors that 
look unlike the offenses listed above. All of these stem from a desire to prevent various actors 
from “obstructing justice.” In this respect, the group of statutes may appear isolated. The internal 
logic of these laws, however, is replicated throughout the realm of corporate regulation. 
Therefore, a careful consideration of the issues posed by prosecutions under the provisions listed 




 II.B.1. Statutory Variants of Obstruction Offenses. 
 
                                                 
85 See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1628 (2007) (“The law 
in this area strains to decisively mark out the boundary between civil and criminal sanctioning.”). 
86 Id. at 1628. 
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 The oldest, most straightforward provision prohibiting the obstruction of justice is  
18 U.S.C. § 1001.87 The section prohibits knowingly and willfully making material 
misrepresentations or concealing a material fact in any matter within the jurisdiction of the 
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government of the United States. It thus 
criminalizes lies to a federal agent in the course of an investigation. Notably, the standards for 
materiality for misrepresentations that trigger penalties under § 1001 vary significantly from 
their brethren in the securities arena.88 Under Brogan v. United States,89 even one-word denials 
(previously known as “exculpatory no’s”) qualify for the offense.90 Some circuits do impose 
restrictions on the type of falsehoods that underpin a conviction under this section, but these 
measures usually limit the ability of vague statutory obligations to lay the foundation for a 
misstatement, instead of redefining materiality outright. 91 
                                                 
87 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006); see also Ch. 321, § 35, 35 Stat. 1095 (1909). 
88 See United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 676 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding blank response can be false statement 
where duty to answer exists), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Daily, 921 F.2d 994, 1003 (10th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 318 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the duty to disclose information was 
a subset of a defendant's § 1001 duty to be truthful); United States v. Kappes, 936 F.2d 227, 231-32 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(describing § 1001 as a "catch-all" for false representations that impair basic agency functions even if 
misrepresentations are not prohibited by other statutes); United States v. Austin, 817 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 
1987) (“[T]he government is not required to prove that the defendant had a duty under some other statute to disclose 
. . . .”); Laura Perry & Stephanie Salek, False Statements and False Claims, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 465, 471-72 
(2008) (‘In addition, silence may constitute a false statement under § 1001 when it serves to mislead or when the 
individual has a duty to speak. . . . The majority of circuits require the duty to disclose be rooted in a “statute, 
governmental regulation, or form” that is independent of § 1001. The Second and Ninth Circuits view § 1001 as a 
“catch-all” provision that imposes a general duty to disclose, thereby making the non-disclosure of a material fact an 
automatic violation.’).  
By contrast, actionable material misstatements in the securities arena must meet much stricter requirements. 
See Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We do not have a system of continuous 
disclosure. Instead firms are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad news) unless positive law 
creates a duty to disclose.”); Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir 2008) (remarking that 
“securities laws don't require firms to disclose all information.”); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (“Where puffing is the order of the day, literal truth can be profoundly misleading, as senders and 
recipients of letters of recommendation well know. Mere sales puffery is not actionable under Rule 10b-5.”); San 
Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1996).  
89 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998); see also United States v. Rashid, 383 F.3d 769, 779 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the fact that the defendant’s false statement did not influence the bank did not make it immaterial under 
§ 1001); United States v. Chen, 324 F.3d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant's false statement that he 
entered the country only two months prior to filing an asylum application was material because it could have 
affected an investigation of illegal alien smuggling); but see United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) 
(describing a statement as material if it has "a natural tendency to influence or [is] capable of influencing" an 
agency); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988) (“[P]etitioners may rebut proof of the elements giving 
rise to the presumption [ of reliance], or show that the misrepresentation in fact did not lead to a distortion of price 
or than an individual plaintiff traded or would have traded despite his knowing the statement was false. . . . Any 
showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the 
plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”). 
90 See generally Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 32 n.129 (2005) 
(explaining that “under this doctrine, a statement that would otherwise have violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was exempt 
from prosecution if it (1) conveyed false information in a situation in which a truthful reply would have incriminated 
the interrogee, and (2) was limited to simple words of denial (such as ‘no, I did not,’ ‘none,’ or ‘never’) rather than 
more elaborate fabrications)”). 
91 See, e.g., United States v. Whiteside, 285 F.3d 1345, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (reversing Medicare fraud convictions 
because the underlying regulations were too vague to flesh out the “knowingly and willfully” requirement of § 1001 
for submitting false documents); U.S v. Anderson, 579 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1978) (to convict under § 1001, 
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 A narrower drive to arrive at the same goals as § 1001 can be found in 18 U.S.C. § 
1503,92 an omnibus obstruction provision that requires specific intent for a violation. Criminal 
liability under § 1503 follows if the defendants:  (1) knew of a pending judicial proceeding and 
(2) corruptly endeavored to obstruct the due administration of justice in that proceeding.93 The 
additional qualifiers of the prohibited conduct have led to several streams of litigation to define 
the statute. In United States v. Aguilar,94 the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the 
Second Circuit’s scope restrictions and held that “[t]he action taken by the accused must be with 
an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to 
influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court's or grand 
jury's authority.”95 That is, “uttering false statements to an investigating agent . . . who might or 
might not testify before a grand jury is [not] sufficient to make out a violation of the catch-all 
provision of § 1503.”96 Several circuits have also pared down the reach of the statute to cover 
only conduct that has a “natural and probable” effect of interfering with justice.97  
An additional provision of Title 1898 extends a 1503-type prohibition on interference to 
administrative and civil proceedings. Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 1510 imposes criminal liability 
for overt bribery and willful disclosure of the contents of subpoenas for financial or insurance 
institutions when done with the intent to obstruct justice.99 While the elements of the statute bear 
a clear relationship to those of §§ 1503 and 1001, this section has not played as important of a 
role in enforcement of business conduct as its siblings.  
Arguably, the most powerful weapon in the obstruction arsenal is § 1512.100 Traditionally 
used “where the defendant misled, threatened, or corruptly persuaded others to do his dirty work 
                                                                                                                                                             
government must prove that the defendant’s statements were actually false under all reasonable interpretations of an 
ambiguous regulation); see also Perry & Salek, supra note 93, 472-474 (explaining the nuances of materiality 
requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001).  
9218 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006).  
93 “Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, 
intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may 
be serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or other committing 
magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account 
of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any 
such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the 
performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, 
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, 
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).” 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006) (emphasis added).  
94 515 U.S. 593 (1995).  
95 Id. at 599 (quoting United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (1982)) 
96 515 U.S. at 598.  
97 See United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 1993) (adopting the “natural and probable effect” standard 
for culpability); United States v. Muhammad, 120 F.3d 688, 695 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that Aguilar requires proof 
of intent to carry out an action that has a “natural and probable effect” of interfering with justice). 
98 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006). 
99 18 U.S.C. § 1510(a)-(d) (2006).  
100 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2006) (“Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens or corruptly persuades another 
person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to . . . hinder, 
delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information 
relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, 
supervised release, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 20 years, or both.”). 
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. . . by destroying documents or lying before a grand jury,”101 it has transformed into a catchall 
provision with the addition of subsection (c) in 2002.102 The modification provided for criminal 
penalties of up to twenty years for anyone who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals 
a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's 
integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.”103 Unsurprisingly, prosecutors have 
found appealing both the absence of a nexus requirement from § 1503104 and the threat of a ten 
more years of imprisonment than that provided by other obstruction sections.105  
In the 2005 decision Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States,106 however, the Supreme 
Court of the United States circumscribed the reach of the statue. The opinion overturned a 
conviction of the accounting firm for obstruction because it found the trial court jury instructions 
on the attribution of guilt under § 1512(b) to be invalid. The Court was struck that these 
instructions permitted the trier of fact to find the defendant guilty even if the defendant “honestly 
and sincerely believed that its conduct was lawful.” 107 The “corruptly” modifier in § 1512(b) 
and (c) served to protect instances where a person was entitled to withhold information from a 
proceeding. Accordingly, the statute could not ascribe criminal penalties to “a mother who 
suggests to her son that he invoke his right against compelled self-incrimination or a wife who 
persuades her husband not to disclose marital confidences.”108 Attorneys who instructed their 
clients that they can withhold certain privileged documents from the government fell into the 
same protected carve-out.109  
Finally, the Court found that the instructions were infirm because ‘they led the jury to 
believe that it did not have to find any nexus between the “persuasion” to destroy documents and 
any particular proceeding.’110 While the statute may have suggested otherwise, the Court applied 
its holding in Aguilar111 broadly to mean that obstruction is impossible without very specific 
intent: “if the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial 
proceeding . . . he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.”112 
 
 II.B.2. Case Studies in the Role of Obstruction Charges in a Corporate Setting  
 
                                                 
101 Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Challenge of Cooperation: The DOJ Risks Killing the Golden Goose through Computer 
Associates / Singleton Theories of Obstruction, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1447, 1458 (2007) 
102 See Act of July 30, 2002, P.L. 107-204, Title XI, § 1102, 116 Stat. 807 (2002). 
103 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2006).  
104 Congress explicitly decreed that for the purposes of liability under § 1512, 
“(1) an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense; and 
  (2) the testimony, or the record, document, or other object need not be admissible in evidence or free of a claim of 
privilege.” 18 U.S.C.  § 1512(f) (2006). See generally O’Sullivan, supra note 106, at 1458-61 (describing the appeal 
of § 1512(c) and the message that prosecutions thereunder sent to the business community); U.S. v. Veal, 153 F.3d 
1233, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that, under § 1512, “[i]t is irrelevant . . . whether the person who provides 
false or misleading information that ultimately becomes relevant to a federal investigation intended that a federal 
investigator receive that information; it is relevant only that the federal investigator or judge received it.”). 
105 See Harvey Silverglate, Making Business A Crime, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2008, at A14.  
106 544 U.S. 696 (2005).  
107 Id. at 706.  
108 Id. at 704 (internal citations omitted).  
109 Id. Note that this statement directly invalidates § 1512(f)(2) pursuant to Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 
383, 395 (1981). See supra note 75.  
110 544 U.S. at 707.  
111 See supra note 89, 515 U.S. at 599.   
112 544 U.S. at 708.  
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 Despite this curtailment, § 1512 has provided grounds for some very interesting theories 
of liability. In the Computer Associates case, the CEO, Sanjay Kumar, implemented a 35-day 
month to meet Wall Street earnings projections.113 This approach covered Fiscal Year 2000 and 
meant that revenue from the first five days of March got booked for February, revenue for the 
first five days April for March, and so on. The company booked revenue. The scheme shifted a 
total of $1.899 billion on a revenue stream of $6.776 billion.114 In 2002, following anonymous 
allegations, the SEC, FBI, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York 
began investigations into accounting irregularities at the company.115 Computer Associates hired 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz as their counsel and publicly pledged full cooperation with the 
government.116 
 Despite these assurances, Wachtell was unable to find any of the large number of 
inculpatory emails exchange by CA executives regarding the matter. It is unclear whether this 
lapse was due to active impediments from management or a limited authorization from the 
board, but EDNY, which by then was leading the case, threatened to indict the company unless it 
produced evidence against Kumar. At this point in time, the board of directors fired Wachtell and 
brought on Sullivan & Cromwell, whose lead attorney, Robert Giuffra, famously promised a 
bottle of champagne to the first associate to find records implicating the CEO.117 A smoking gun 
surfaced and the prosecutors secured an indictment against Kumar for violating 18 U.SC. § 
1512(c)(2). The document charged that Kumar “did not disclose, falsely denied, and otherwise 
concealed[,] . . . concocted and presented to [Wachtell] an assortment of false justifications” and 
material misrepresentations with knowledge and intent to obstruct the government 
investigations.118  Kumar was also alleged to have lied to FBI officers during the proceedings. 
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the basis that lies to private external 
counsel lack a sufficient nexus to an official proceeding to give rise to liability under 
1512(c)(2).119 The district court found the indictment’s allegations that Kumar made statements 
he knew to be materially false to the FBI sufficient to uphold the charge and dismissed the 
motion.120 Thereafter, Kumar plead guilty to the obstruction and fraud charges and was 
sentenced to 12 years in prison.121  
                                                 
113 Indictment, United States v. Kumar, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96141 (E.D.N.Y July 28, 2005) (Cr. No. 04-846), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/compassocs.pdf [hereinafter Kumar Indictment].  
114 “[T]he practice was wrong but also less than earth-shattering, at least when considered in light of the twelve-year 
sentence that Kumar received (to be fair, for both the fraud and the obstruction) and the possibility that a criminal 
case would have destroyed the company and the livelihood of its many employees. After all, the deals concluded 
five days into the next quarter were real deals and the revenues were real; from a defense perspective, they were 
simply put in the wrong column.” O’Sullivan, supra note 106, at 1453.  
115 Id. at 1452.  
116 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ex. C P 6, United States v. Computer Associates Int'l, Inc., Cr. No. 04-837 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/356028/000095012304011246/y02481exv10w1.htm). 
117 O’Sullivan, supra note 106, at 1454.  
118 Id. at 1456.  
119 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Stephen Richards' Motion to Dismiss Counts Six and Seven of the 
Second Superseding Indictment at 20-25, United States v. Kumar, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96141, (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 
2005) (No. 04-846).  
120 ‘Paragraph 72 recites, in essence, that when interviewed by FBI agents and others at the United States Attorney's 
Office on November 5, 2003, Sanjay Kumar made materially false statements and representations in an attempt to 
con-ceal his involvement in the 35-day month practice. Paragraphs 73, 74 and 75 recite with specificity the allegedly 
false statements made by Kumar and paragraph 76 alleges that Kumar knew and believed at that interview that his 
statements were false and that he concealed information he knew was material to the Government Investigations and 
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 This outcome provides a worthwhile comparison to that of United States v. Singleton. In 
Singleton, the defendant worked as a natural gas trader for El Paso Corporation, which was being 
investigated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the local U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for misreporting trades to manipulate the natural gas market.122 El Paso 
pledged full cooperation to the authorities carrying out these investigations. Accordingly, it 
retained counsel to conduct an internal investigation into whether any of its employees provided 
inaccurate natural gas pricing information to trade publications. This conduct would have 
affected the price and profit points of trades based on an index to be provided by these 
publications.123 El Paso turned over all results of the internal investigation to the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office. Thereafter, a grand jury indicted Greg Singleton for § 1512(c)(2) obstruction, in addition 
to nine counts of conspiracy, wire fraud, and false reporting. The alleged misconduct took place 
when the defendant “did not disclose, falsely denied, and otherwise concealed that he had 
provided false information to trade publications” to El Paso’s outside counsel while believing 
that “El Paso's Outside Lawyers would inform government agencies of his statements during the 
interview.”124 
 The defendant moved to dismiss the obstruction indictment for failing to state an offense 
recognized by law.125 The district court dismissed the motion, holding that a private party lying 
to external counsel could provide the requisite causal nexus to obstruction of an official 
proceeding without defendant’s knowledge that false statements would be turned over. The 
memorandum opinion reasoned that: “The allegations, if proved . . . , could raise the inference 
that Singleton expected and thus arguably intended that his intentionally false statements would 
be supplied to the Federal government in connection with one or more of these identified official 
proceedings.”126 At trial, Singleton was acquitted after proving that El Paso’s counsel stated that 
they were not “acting as an arm of the investigative agencies.”127  
As Professor O’Sullivan pointed out, the most important aspect of the Singleton 
indictment was the absence of certain key points. The document made “no reference to a 
corporate decision (whether communicated to Singleton or not) by El Paso to cooperate with the 
government or waive applicable privileges, including the protections that would shield 
Singleton's conversations with counsel from discovery. By comparison, Computer Associates 
featured an intentional plan to derail an investigation.”128 Thus, under the theory of Singleton, as 
endorsed by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, a material misstatement or 
omission to private corporate counsel may constitute obstruction solely based on the intent of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
would have the effect of obstructing and impeding the Government Investigations. . . . The indictment plainly 
charges the defendants with conduct that bears a “relationship in time, causation or logic” to an “official 
proceeding” as that term is used in § 1512(c)(2) and defined in § 1515(a)(1)(C).’ United States v. Kumar, 04 CR 
846(S-2) (ILG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96142 at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006).  
121 See O’Sullivan, supra note 106, at 1465; Sentencing Results, United States v. Kumar, Cr. No. 04-846 (ILG) 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nye/vw/PendingCases/US_v_SANJAY_KUMAR_and_STEPHEN_RICHARDS_Court_
events.pdf.  
122 See O’Sullivan, supra note 106, at 1468; Indictment, United States v. Singleton, No. H-06-080, 2006 WL 
3326639 at *10 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Singleton Indictment]. 
123 Singleton Indictment at *2, *3, *10.  
124 Id. at *11.  
125 United States v. Singleton, No. H-06-080, 2006 WL 1984467, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 14, 2006) 
126 Id. at *6.  
127 See O’Sullivan, supra note 106, at 1468.  
128 Id. at 1467.  
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perpetrator. If she believes this information will be turned over to investigators, then 1512(c)(2) 
imposes liability, regardless of whether the hand-off actually took place. The logic here begins to 
resemble charges of attempting to carry out a factually impossible crime.129 
A third useful illustration of the role that obstruction charges play in the corporate setting 
comes from the recent prosecution of former Broadcom executives for option backdating.130 
According to the SEC,131 Henry Samueli, the co-founder, Chief Technological Officer, and 
former Chairman of the Board of Directors, along with three other officers of the California 
semiconductor manufacturer, systematically changed grant dates listed on option awards to 
ensure that these instruments immediately yielded economic value. As a result, the awarded 
stock options were “at the money” – their exercise price exactly matched the price of Broadcom 
stock on NASDAQ. This process permitted Broadcom to offer individuals significant extra 
compensation without showing any concomitant expense on their income statement or balance 
sheet. Over its seven-year duration, the scheme led Broadcom to understate its total 
compensation expense by $2.2 billion.132 
To carry out the plan, the defendants used a document claiming to represent the 
unanimous consent of the company’s board of directors.133 This permitted Samueli and his 
cohorts to usurp the authority formally allocated to the compensation committee and two 
independent directors.134 Predictably, participating individuals discussed their actions over 
various forms of communication, including email. Overall, the SEC claimed that the conduct 
constituted numerous violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act.135 Beyond that, the U.S. Attorney’s Office named Samueli seventy two 
times in its indictment of Dr. Henry T. Nicholas, Broadcom’s CEO and Samueli’s co-conspirator 
in the conduct.136  
Samueli himself was never indicted. Instead, he plead guilty to one charge of obstruction 
of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for making the knowingly false statement that he was “not 
involved in the actual granting process” (he later acknowledged selecting suitable grant dates and 
signing seventeen Unanimous Written Consents to effectuate these decisions).137 The plea 
agreement stipulated that Samueli was to serve no jail time, undergo five years’ probation, and 
pay $12 million to the United States Treasury. He had no duty to cooperate with further 
investigations of his own or his colleagues conduct; in fact, the U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed not 
to prosecute Samueli for any violations unearthed during its investigation into Broadcom’s 
activities. The plea bargain came a year after a similar one from the head of Broadcom’s Human 
                                                 
129 See, e.g., People v. Dlugash, 363 N.E. 2d 1155 (N.Y. 1977); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493 (N.J. 1993) (holding 
that despite the actual impossibility of transmitting HIV by spitting, a defendant may be guilty of attempted murder 
if he believed such a transmission was possible and clearly intended to carry it out). See generally Rollin M. Perkins, 
Criminal Attempt and Related Problems, 2 UCLA L. REV. 319 (1955); Kenneth W Simons, Mistake and 
Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 447, 467-69 
(1990).  
130 See generally Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802 (2005).  
131 Complaint, Securities & Exchange Commission v. Nicholas (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. SACV08-539 CJC (RNBx)), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20574.pdf.  
132 Id. at 2.  
133 U.S. v. Samueli, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2008).  
134 SEC Charges Four Current and Former Broadcom Officers for Backdating Options, Litigation Release No. 20574 
(May 14, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20574.htm.   
135 Id.  
136 U.S. v. Samueli, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1159-60.  
137 Id. at 1157, 1160. 
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Resources department, although the latter led to a much longer prison sentence.138 At the time of 
this Article, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California rejected Samueli’s plea 
for excess leniency on the grounds that the prosecution’s neglect of its substantive accusations 
created the impression that justice was for sale.139 In doing so, Judge Carney appears to have 
embraced many of the concerns that the remainder of this Article will seek to elucidate. 
 
II.C. The Relationship between Corporate Conduct and Individual Culpability 
 
The careful observer will notice a shift in focus between the discussion of substantive 
regulations of corporate activity in Part I and the delineation of existing obstruction 
jurisprudence in the previous section. Both United States v. Singleton and United States v. 
Kumar charged individuals with violations of the U.S. Code, though both took place in the midst 
of ongoing investigations into the misconduct of the companies themselves. The litigation in 
Arthur Andersen was distinct in this respect – there, the prosecutors indicted the entire firm, 
destroying it even before the initial guilty verdict.  
Several scholars have put together comprehensive discussions of the relationship between 
corporate misdeeds and individual liability.140 This Article will not attempt to replicate their 
work or condense their nuanced observations. Rather, for current purposes, a few main points 
will suffice. First, companies traditionally pay their employees’ legal fees. In most situations, 
managers are not responsible for reimbursing the firm unless a jury finds them guilty of a 
business-related crime.141 Moreover, companies often take out liability insurance on behalf of 
their officers and directors.142 This symbiotic relationship belies the fact that the primarily 
responsibility of a corporation is to its shareholders, not its employees. The corporate general 
counsel represents the former, not the latter, and may often be forced to make decisions that 
adversely affect the second group. For example, managers usually have to cooperate with their 
                                                 
138 See id. at 1162; Amir Efrati, Ex-Broadcom Officer Pleads Guilty - Samueli Admits False Statement In Backdating 
Case, Wall St. J., June 24, 2008, at B2.  
139 U.S. v. Samueli, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 1162-65.  
140 See, e.g., Diskant, supra note 15; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Architecture of American Corporate Law: 
Faciliation and Regulation, 2 BERKLEY BUS. L. J. 167 (2005); Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and 
the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers under Delaware Law, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 475 (2007); Loewenstein supra 
note 5; Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal 
Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651 (2002).  
141 See Noah D. Stein, Note, Should the Government Scrutinize an Organization’s Payment of Its Employees’ 
Attorneys’ Fees?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3245, 3249 (2007) (“[I]f the organization has promised to advance expenses 
to employees, then it must make the advances even if it appears likely that an employee's wrongful conduct will 
make indemnification unavailable to the employee at the end of the case.”); see also Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, 
The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 
DUQ. L. REV. 307, 332-334 (2003) (noting that the vast majority of states have adopted statutes permitting such 
treatment of legal fees); Stephen A. Radin, "Sinners Who Find Religion": Advancement of Litigation Expenses to 
Corporate Officials Accused of Wrongdoing, 25 REV. LITIG. 251, 258-59 (2006) (citing Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 
888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005)). But see Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of 
Executives' Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts 24-25 (Aug. 29, 2006) (unpublished research paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927783 (citing an organized crime example to illustrate a potential danger of advancement 
in the corporate context); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) ("A defendant 
has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person's money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those 
funds are the only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his choice... . The government does 
not violate the Sixth Amendment if it seizes the ... proceeds [of a crime] and refuses to permit the defendant to use 
them to pay for his defense."). 
142 See Loewenstein, supra note 5, at 378.  
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employer’s request for information. Their answers to counsel retained by the corporation fall 
under the broad rubric of confidential communications with an attorney. The privilege to 
withhold this data flows to the client, who, in this case, is the business, not the respondent. Thus, 
a company can choose to release any information that inculpates one of its employees to a 
government authority or third party against the employee’s will.143 
Enforcement agencies frequently take advantage of this dynamic to get quick results. In 
fact, for a period of three years, the Department of Justice demanded that companies throw their 
employees overboard as a condition for lenient treatment.144 Under the Thompson Memorandum, 
any entity under investigation had to waive their attorney-client privilege, carry out a detailed 
internal investigation, and disclose all of its results before it would be considered cooperative.145 
This label resulted in milder prosecutorial tactics: cooperating businesses usually avoided 
destructive company-wide indictments.146 Few were sufficiently risk-neutral to aggressively 
rebut the demands of the government.  
To many observers, this pattern of behavior yielded undesirable, if not inequitable, 
results.147 An anonymous tip could start a criminal investigation. The U.S. Attorney would 
approach the firm and offer leniency in exchange for cooperation and indictment in return for 
any other course of action. The latter would disqualify a company from being traded on a U.S. 
                                                 
143 Hence the Upjohn / Zar warning. See, e.g., Sheila Finnegan, The First 72 Hours of a Government Investigation: 
A Guide to Identifying Issues and Avoiding Mistakes, PRACTICING L. INST. CORP L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK 
SERIES 901, 930 (Nov. 2006) (describing Zar warning); O’Sullivan, supra note 106, at 1473.   
144 The Thompson Memorandum was promulgated on January 20, 2003; the Department of Justice replaced it with 
the McNulty Memorandum on December 12, 2006. See Ashby Jones, Thompson Memo Out, McNulty Memo In, 
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Dec. 12, 2006, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/12/thompson-memo-out-
mcnulty-memo-in/.  
145  
General Principle: In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation's timely and 
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate with the government's 
investigation may be relevant factors. In gauging the extent of the corporation's cooperation, the 
prosecutor may consider the corporation's willingness to identify the culprits within the 
corporation, including senior executives; to make witnesses available; to disclose the complete 
results of its internal investigation; and to waive attorney-client and work product protection.  
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20. 
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm (last visited March 16, 2009) 
[hereinafter Thompson Memo], at Parts VI.A; see also id. at Part VI.B. This policy substantially mimics the 
guidelines set out in the predecessor to the Thompson Memorandum. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy 
Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Att'ys (June 16. 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html (last visited March 16, 2009) 
[hereinafter Holder Memo], at Part VI(B). The Memorandum states that the prosecutor may consider the 
completeness of corporate disclosure of all relevant communications and findings, as well as its waiver of attorney-
client privilege in the charging decision. It further states: “Some agencies, such as the SEC and the EPA, as well as 
the Department's Environmental and Natural Resources Division, have formal voluntary disclosure programs in 
which self-reporting, coupled with remediation and additional criteria, may qualify the corporation for amnesty or 
reduced sanctions.” Akin to its progeny, the Holder Memo establishes that waiver is not an absolute requirement for 
lenient treatment. It also notes that “prosecution and economic policies specific to the industry or statute may require 
prosecution notwithstanding a corporation's willingness to cooperate. For example, the Antitrust Division offers 
amnesty only to the first corporation to agree to cooperate.” Id.  
146 See id.; Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 167 (2008).  
147 See, e.g., Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the 
Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 904 ("The defense bar has repeatedly raised concerns about 
these policies . . . ."). 
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stock exchange, void key insurance contracts, trigger defaults on loans and bonds, and bar the 
entity from certain lucrative contracts, guaranteeing its collapse.148  
Naturally, the company could choose cooperation. Executives would then initiate an 
internal investigation through either inside or outside counsel. The lawyers would interview low-
level employees, who, if they were less than forthcoming, would face a discharge for 
insubordination and possible prosecution without access to a firm-sponsored attorney. 
Unsurprisingly, most people on the lower steps of the corporate ladder cooperate fully. The 
company would then turn over any inculpatory admissions to the government, which would 
utilize them as building blocks of accusations against individuals further up on the management 
chart. At some point, the investigators would be satisfied that they nabbed the culprits and would 
offer the company a final deal. Option One: throw the suspects overboard by providing the 
prosecution with key witnesses in exchange for a deferred prosecution agreement, a civil fine, or 
a termination of the investigation. Option Two: face a newly powerful case built on vicarious 
liability for offenses that are now fully fleshed out.149  
The incentive structure powering the entire process meant that a company comprised of 
rational actors would almost always find scapegoats in exchange for its own protection. 
Moreover, individual participants at all levels were usually powerless to change this outcome – 
they all faced the traditional prisoner’s dilemma pitting uncertainty about the behavior of others 
against self-interest. In many situations, the scenario took an even more nefarious twist. Since 
most corporate officers were aware of the standard plotline, they hired personal criminal 
attorneys at the first sign of an internal investigation or external enforcement interest. The 
company would pay for these lawyers, who would advise employees on the least dangerous (and 
revealing) responses to questionnaires or interviews. Predictably, these tactics slowed the 
investigation; to prevent such roadblocks, a U.S. Attorney would occasionally demand that the 
company stop advancing legal fees to its employees if it wanted to be seen as cooperative.  
Some of the recipients of these tactics alleged that the pressure on a company to 
withdraw financial support that it contractually promised prior to any finding of guilt violated 
their Fifth Amendment due process rights and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. In U.S. v. 
Stein,150 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit eventually agreed. Moreover, soon after the 
initial district court decision finding for the plaintiffs,151 Arlen Specter, the U.S. Senator from 
Pennsylvania, introduced a bill that would provide rigid prosecutorial standards and make 
behavior underlying the Stein complaint illegal.152 As a result of these developments, the 
Department of Justice replaced the offending guidelines with a modified version known as the 
                                                 
148 See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406 (2008); Bucy, supra note 15, at 1301-02; Diskant, supra note 15, at 142 & n.56.  
149 See generally Stein, supra note 124, at 3267 (““[T]he government regularly flips witnesses to uncover facts in an 
investigation, using the threat of prosecution to secure cooperation by parties whom they believe to be criminally 
culpable. Furthermore, prosecutors "ask cooperating drug dealers, bank robbers and gun-toting felons to waive their 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination," and they do so "all the time [even though] the vast majority 
of [those criminals] do not have access to ... high-priced legal talent.");  
150 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).  
151 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).   
152 Pedro Ruz Guttierez, AG Mukasey Hints at Revision of McNulty Memo, Spars with Senators at Hearing, LEGAL 
TIMES, July 10, 2008,  http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202422864034; Ashby Jones, Thomspon Memo Out, 
McNulty Memo In, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Dec. 12, 2006, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/12/thompson-memo-out-
mcnulty-memo-in/; Pamela A. MacLean, McNulty Memo on Attorney-Client Privilege Blasted for Lack of Change, 
NAT. L. J., Jan. 26, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005553208; Dan Slater, On McNulty Memo, 
Specter Fires Back at DOJ, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG, July 11, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/07/11/on-
mcnulty-memo-specter-fires-back-at-doj/.  
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McNulty Memorandum.153 Unlike its predecessor, the McNulty Memorandum restricted 
situations where a prosecutor could ask for a waiver of attorney-client privilege only when there 
is a legitimate need to do so in order to fulfill their law enforcement obligations (mere 
convenience does not suffice).154 Before doing so, the U.S. Attorney had to obtain written 
approval from his superiors.155 Prosecutors could still accept a company’s offer to waive 
privilege and provide full disclosure of relevant communications in exchange for lenient 
treatment at their discretion.156 Moreover, the new document specified that prosecutors should 
not exert pressure on businesses to terminate legal assistance supported by prior contractual 
obligations.157  
 
III. Evaluating the Current Regime 
 
So far, this Article has provided a positive description of the types and sources of rules 
governing the behavior of public companies in the United States. One group of authorities 
(general corporate law) applies across a larger set of business entities; a second (the regulation of 
takeovers and tender offers) kicks in only in a few scenarios; others still (criminal indictments 
for wire fraud) may never actually take place in the lifespan of a given enterprise. According to 
scholars and practitioners, however, all of these rules matter a lot. They delineate limits for 
acceptable behavior by both a company as a whole and its employee constituents. Within this 
playing field, the laws then ascribe costs to particular actions, both incidental (such as the time it 
takes to carry out a proxy battle) and expectancy-based (the probability that the absence of a 
particular point in a MD&A section of a quarterly report will lead to a successful civil suit for 
damages).  
 Unlike the natural laws of disciplines like physics, this man-made environment is facially 
flawed. Some rules appear redundant, others misguided. In a few situations, the mistakes come 
from incorrect analysis of the impact of a particular regulation, whereas in others, deficiencies 
arise because no one ever considered the impact of the regulation at all. Of course, observations 
like this are banal because they apply to every area of human creative endeavor. Criticism 
becomes interesting only when it provides a new way of evaluating the quality of the field in 
question or pinpoints a change that, pursuant to some theory, is an ambiguous improvement. The 
remainder of this Article will attempt to accomplish both of these goals.  
 
III.A. A Theory of Regulation 
 
III.A.1. Rules, Boundaries, and Parameters.  
 
A good place to begin an evaluation of an object is by restating known reasons for that 
object’s existence. In the case at hand, corporate regulation serves to accomplish certain goals. 
At the most abstract level, it aims to set out limits for what businesses can and cannot do. These 
boundaries derive from a balance struck by the body politic between aggressive, profit-seeking 
                                                 
153 Memorandum from Paul J. Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Att'ys (Dec. 12, 
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf (last visited March 16, 2009) 
[hereinafter McNulty Memorandum]. 
154 McNulty Memorandum, supra, at Part VII.B.2, p. 8.   
155 Id.  
156 Id. at p. 11.  
157 McNulty Memorandum, supra note 148, at Part VII.B.3, p. 11.  
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action and fear that when unbridled, this motive can overwhelm important objectives like 
altruism and human dignity.  
Specific limits on the actions of a particular enterprise vary with its perceived power. 
Small sole proprietorships face essentially no restrictions outside of the employment arena, 
where, despite their size, they wield considerable influence over the lives of community 
members. Large private companies, whether organized as corporations, limited liability 
companies, or partnerships, face a different set of rules. These are motivated by the entities’ 
potential to earn significant returns on an investment of societal resources and decision to restrict 
their use of the public sphere to accomplish these objectives. From the perspective of modern 
legal theory, the second characteristic means that the aforementioned organizations foreswear 
access to the most powerful tools of economic success (such as soliciting capital contributions 
from lay individuals, which can allow a company to gobble up resources and overwhelm 
competitors). As a result, their capacity to change the public landscape to better suit their profit 
motive is limited. By contrast, public corporations retain the motivation of their private brethren 
and desire to utilize every available method of attaining their goals. They operate openly in the 
public sphere, affecting a much greater number of individuals who do not seek out contact with 
the venture.  
For the most part, the various sources of regulations described in Parts I and II of this 
Article set out the limits on acceptable corporate behavior. These limits do not have to be purely 
negative. The duty to disclose material information is an affirmative obligation of a public 
company. From a purely legal standpoint, it looks quite distinct from a prohibition on looting of 
corporate resources. As boundary conditions for corporate behavior, however, the two function 
in a fundamentally similar way. The two rules have limited scope: they specify that as long as a 
firm satisfies condition X or condition Y, it is free to do as it pleases in every other domain. 158 
This quality is both necessary and sufficient to set up a border. By contrast, certain rules, which 
this Article will label “parameters,” leave no room for free decision. Examples of this type 
include “always do as the Bible says” and “every decision must maximize total social utility.”  
 
III.A.2. Why Regulate with Boundaries Instead of Parameters?  
  
There are several reasons why a community would choose to govern business activities 
through boundaries instead of parameters. The most important one is that a regulator may not be 
able to identify a universal goal with any confidence. Alternatively, even if she is capable of 
doing so, she may lack sufficient information to articulate a method by which affected entities 
should strive for the goal. The truth of either or both of these propositions, however, does not 
entail that the same regulator could not describe some or even most of the activities that her 
subjects should avoid.  
Despite its abstraction, this rhetoric has a straightforward application to businesses. 
Members of the American public vociferously disagree on the goals of a public corporation. 
Some argue that these entities should be dedicated primarily towards generating as much profit 
                                                 
158 It is unclear whether this is entirely correct. The scope of a boundary is the entire domain of an action.  
Otherwise, it seizes to be a boundary and becomes an obstacle. For example, on a Cartesian x-y plane, a line from 
(0, 2) to (0, 20) is not a boundary per se. It does not delimit a function in a significant way. If the entire plane is 
shaded, the total area protected by the line will be 0. By contrast, a line at y = 2, spanning from (0, - ∞) to (0, ∞) will 
protect an infinitely large area of the plane from shading. Similarly, a circle, defined by y = root of ( 1 – x^2) will 
protect an area of 3.1415926 . . . . In a fundamental way, the scope of the latter two functions is global - there is 
nowhere on the plane where their premise does not hold true – while the scope of the first one is restricted.  
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as possible; others request that they deploy their resources in a way that benefits the maximum 
number of citizens; others still ask them to use their size to overcome common-good problems 
by investing in research and development, but do not object to the companies capturing any 
surplus resulting from this boost in efficiency. While individual lawmakers, jurists, and 
regulators hold strong beliefs about the value of the above strategies, no one has yet been able to 
articulate a universally accepted mission statement for corporations in a capitalist democracy.  
Suppose this was not the case because some distinguished body came up with a principle 
for corporate behavior that garnered global consensus. Even in this idyllic world, in the absence 
of perfect, complete information, a regulator would still be unable to prescribe a pathway for all 
existing and future companies to move towards this goal. An instruction to follow this principle 
would not be sufficient to counteract the destructive attributes of an abstract entity dominated by 
groupthink and prone to exaggerating individual ambitions. In order to get any meaningful 
control over the behavior of her subjects that is not rooted in arbitrary, discretionary power, the 
regulator would have to offer more detailed rules. At this point, she would again encounter an 
information deficiency. Unless she assumes that she can list all appropriate ways to move 
towards the goal, she will have to settle for explaining what companies may not do. An arena of 
free action delimited by specific boundaries thus emerges as a consequence of a desire to 
regulate corporate conduct with incomplete information.  
 
III.A.3. Second-Order Regulations 
 
In order to craft an informative description of the regulatory arena, one must add a few 
complications to a model simply demarcated by boundaries. Consider the discussion of rules in 
the preceding section. Rules aim to achieve certain goals. Limited information available to the 
rule-making authority should mean that positive prescriptions do not usually make sense because 
even a conceited regulator will be unlikely to believe that they can articulate the optimal strategy 
for every business. So, the theory suggests, rational regulators should choose to govern by 
negative decree.  
Some of the rules governing corporate behavior described in Parts I and II clearly fit that 
description better than others. For example, the duty of loyalty can be neatly characterized as a 
prohibition on self-interested behavior by officers and directors of a corporation. The SOX 
requirement that auditors approve internal compliance programs is much harder to squeeze into 
the boundary box.159  
 
                                                 
159 The extent that this requirement cannot be recharacterized as a rule but remains a parameter may itself signal a 
fundamental inefficiency. Part III.A.2 explains that a rational regulator should choose rules as a means of instructing 
a plethora of firms in getting to some policy destination to deal with her limited information about the specific 
circumstances facing individual constituents. Unlike most rules, the auditor certification requirement leaves little 
wiggle room for subject companies. The provision’s problem therefore appears to be the presence of a one-size-fits-
all approach to regulation where one would expect a broader mission statement (“disclosure of all material risks,” 
“independence of accounting from managerial influence,” etc.) coupled with limited prescriptions.  
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For now, however, suppose the audit requirement can be recharacterized as a negative 
rule. Even in this case, its superimposition over existing boundaries of corporate conduct may 
create prima facie inefficiency. Consider a regulatory framework promulgated at time 1 with 
rules requiring companies to do A, B, and C, but nothing else. This structure demarcates a space 
for business creativity that observers can visualize as a triangle. Within this sandbox, 
corporations can do as they please; if they step outside, they by definition engage in prohibited 
conduct that must be punished.160 Now, suppose that at time 2, a different rulemaker decrees that 
while doing A, B, and C, subject entities must also do X, Y, and Z (most pronouncements in the 
real world take this form because the authorizing body fails to explicitly remove older 
requirements even if it deems them obsolete). Any preexisting activity that fails to fit into the 
XYZ space is no longer valid. So long as X, Y, and Z, are all distinct from A, B, and C, the 
second layer of regulation works as a distinct space (Figure 1). In this system, the cost of a rule is 
the inverse of its length: challenging regulations are short, lax ones are long. When the 
requirements of X, Y, and Z are each equally onerous to those of A, B, and C, the two groups 
                                                 
160 Note that this notion of a fully demarcated arena could not apply to individuals subject to U.S. law. Negative 
liberties preserved in the constitution and its amendments trump any efforts to “enclose” permissible human 
behavior by statute or regulation.   
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The impact of the superimposition of the second set of rules on corporate behavior is 
drastic. As illustrated by Figure 2, businesses have much less room to act, with only the shaded 
interior of the star constituting valid decision space. Recall that the reason for positioning the 
XYZ vertices between A, B, and C is the distinction between the content of the two sets of 
regulations. The triangles share a center axis because their motivation – to optimize corporate 
behavior, broadly – is the same. In the graphical representation, rotating the XYZ closer to ABC 
would mean that the rules proscribe similar actions; indeed, they become entirely redundant 
when X, Y, and Z are positioned directly on top of A, B, and C.161  
By comparison, as shown by Option 1 in Figure 3, one can draw a regular hexagon 
AXBYCZ that would touch on every policy objective while preserving significant space for 
companies to operate without interference. A slightly more constricting solution illustrated by 
Option 2 of Figure 3 would use the outline of the two triangles but delete the internal lines. 
Policymakers should choose between the two based on their ability to tolerate the risk of an 
infraction. The narrow approach (Option 1) errs on the side of caution by excluding operating 
space that is not explicitly endorsed by either set of regulations, while the broader approach 
                                                 
161 This aspect of the model underlines an important point. As mentioned above, when Congress or an agency 
promulgates a new set of rules for some area, they may amend the previous version of a document dealing with the 
same general area of activity. The largest constraints on behavior, however, come from the interaction of the new 
rules with existing, seemingly unrelated provisions. These constraints may be intentional when Congress or a 
regulator wants to redefine the entirety of the arena of permissible action, but in most cases, they appear accidental 
and inefficient. It is worth reiterating that cleaning up only those items that the new statute or pronouncement is 
intended to replace would do little to fix this particular problem. If the older “stumps” are actually similar to new 
provisions in intent but differ by a matter of degree, old boundaries would run parallel to the new ones. Giving effect 
to the new legislation would thus mean honoring the freshest line in the sand, be it more or less constricting than the 
predecessor. Courts and subjects would be expected to have substantial difficulty identifying relevant boundaries 
only where the prior objectives lie orthogonally to the updates. Part IV of this Article will identify obstruction / 
compliance as an instance of such hotwire intersections.     
By Ilya Podolyako  April 30, 2009 
Multilayer Regulation and Efficiency Costs 
Page 32 of 45 
(Option 2) allots companies additional freedom to carry out actions that, while not specifically 






Within the multilayer regulation model, the impact of adding requirements A, B and C 
varies noticeably across integration methods. As each layer of regulation becomes more 
complex, the integration-based differences in outcomes increase in scope exponentially. There 
are many more ways to connect six policy vertices than there are to connect three. Whereas the 
example given above essentially had three distinct integrated outcomes, a superimposition of a 
ten-pointed policy initiative over the ABCXYZ landscape would yield hundreds. The choice 
between these becomes equally difficult to make, even if one knows their precise criteria for 
evaluating each pattern. If there is uncertainty about the evaluation methodology that attaches to 
the new pronouncement, the task at hand becomes nearly impossible.  
These trends suggest that the body in charge of promulgating a given set of rules should 
dedicate considerable effort to spelling out their preferred method of integration in the clearest 
possible terms. Failure to do so will leave later interpreters to playing a game of blindfolded 
capture-the-flag, with no real way to discern between a myriad of directions.  For example, this 
Article argues that informational asymmetries inherent to the world at large mean that regulators 
should err on the side of freedom. Therefore, for any given set of objectives, the best method of 
integration is the one that leaves subject entities with the largest arena in which to operate 
(Option 1 in Figure 3 below). A reader with a different philosophical orientation may disagree 
with the assumptions and values feeding into that selection. He may well seek to replace these 
with his own, but in doing so, he must acknowledge that if Congress had passed his version of 
the rules, a judge would be much less likely to guess the intended, “best” approach without 
explicit guidance from   the drafters than he would with such information built right in to the 
regulation.  
Furthermore, without the requisite selection criteria, entities responsible for applying the 
rules may choose a broad reading in one context or a narrow one in another. This asymmetry 
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itself could undermine the objectives of the underlying act without explicitly contravening its 
prescriptions. Such decisions, whether rendered by a court or an agency, may become very 
difficult to undo.  
Finally, it is worth noting that an adjudicator’s decisions on the optimal shape of the 
regulated arena are independent of their interpretation of the actual statutory commands. The 
latter process serves only to locate the vertices (A, B, C, X, Y, and Z) on the behavioral plane, 
whereas the former looks to connect them together into a coherent whole. Clarifying specific 
commands will not resolve the ambiguity on fit. Instead, at a minimum, the policymakers must 
specify the extent to which new regulations preempt seemingly unrelated old ones.   
 
III.A.4. Applying the Paradigm to the Real World 
 
Charts and shapes in a legal article prove little. Consider, however, the relationship 
between obstruction statutes and securities laws. As discussed in Part I, one of the central tenets 
of the current framework of securities regulation is disclosure of material information. 
Obstruction charges closely parallel these considerations by punishing individuals who withhold 
material information from investigators. In both situations, an omission of a key fact can lead to 
liability. The standard of materiality, however, differs significantly between the two bodies of 
applicable law.  
This divergence leads to peculiar results. A public corporation may submit quarterly 
reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission that are materially accurate and thereby 
satisfy all of the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Acts. If, however, the SEC decides 
to investigate said company for fraud, invites its CEO in for an interview, and the CEO decides 
to reveal only information contained in Form 10Q, the criminal law may find an obstruction 
violation.162  
This result makes little sense. When a person who provides an adequate amount of 
information in one scenario can be prosecuted on the grounds that this same amount of 
information is inadequate in a different scenario, the notion of “adequacy” loses meaning. Along 
with it goes a chunk of the justification for the extant securities regulation regime. If government 
agents are unable to carry out an investigation without getting information above and beyond that 
contained in the required quarterly filings, it is not clear how a lay person is supposed to make an 
informed investing decision on the basis of this same information. 
Some might argue that the SEC has a right to more information than private parties 
because it must carry out its responsibility for enforcing securities laws. On its face, this 
objection sounds reasonable – the rights of a person suspected of wrongdoing may change from 
those held by an innocent bystander.163 The logic of this position, however, does not withstand 
further scrutiny. Existing securities laws require more than just the disclosure of all information 
that the issuer deems material. Instead, they impose detailed requirements for the type of data 
that a company must release to the public and the SEC. These include audits, financial 
                                                 
162 See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998); compare with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 
(1976) (holding that the intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud” is required for both private suits and SEC 
enforcement actions to lie based on a violation of Securities Act § 10(b)); Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., Inc. 269 F.3d 
806 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that there is no duty to update previously accurate quarterly reports with publicly 
available news of adverse material developments by reasoning that ‘a statement may be “corrected” only if it was 
incorrect when made’).  
163 For example, upon indictment or subpoena, a suspect or material witness has to testify about any information that 
is not privileged. A lay person has no such duty.   
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statements, certificates for internal compliance programs, a discussion of all risk factors, the 
name of directors and executives, compensation formulas, etcetera. If the concept of materiality 
included all of these bits by default, laws and regulations setting out the requirements would be 
redundant. Since it is common practice to presume that legislation is not duplicative unless 
clearly proven otherwise, one may conclude that, from the perspective of Congress or the 
regulators, certain pieces of information are worth disclosing even if they are immaterial. That is, 
this information would convey more benefit to someone than it costs to disclose and assemble.  
So long as the doctrine that a company is required to release all and only material 
information remains true,164 the investing public cannot be the intended beneficiary of disclosure 
requirements’ largesse. Thus, to the extent that current regulations force firms to make public 
data beyond the scope of a bare-bones materiality standard, they must aim to improve the lives of 
the only other parties with a stake in corporate conduct – the regulators themselves. Of course, 
criminal statutes frequently have different requirements than civil ones dealing with the same 
acts. Yet the former almost never punish something when the latter fails to assign liability to it.  
In other words, criminal liability ordinarily constitutes a subset of all liability, but the 
ability of prosecutors to pursue obstruction charges in the absence of substantive securities 
violations turns this relationship on its head. Ostensibly, the judicial system asks companies to 
release additional information to make it easier for enforcement agencies to uncover fraud. By 
doing so, however, criminal law conveys the message that the instructions of its civil sibling 
should be taken with a grain of salt – by themselves, they can neither provide a defense against 
later attacks nor offer lay shareholders enough information to detect mismanagement. Yet these 
instructions carry lofty compliance costs that turn to unnecessary waste when their product 
becomes useless.165  
In light of these observations, it is is worthwhile to reconsider the Samueli case, 
introduced in Part II.B.3. Both the SEC and the U.S. Attorney alleged copious instances of fraud, 
mismanagement, and substantive violations of the Securities and Exchange Acts. Yet to date, the 
results of the Broadcom investigations have been limited to significant shareholder loss, bad 
press, and two guilty pleases for obstruction. This outcome does not mesh well with the concept 
underlying liability for material misstatements and omissions. The reluctance of the prosecutors 
to press forward with these violations suggests that either the errors were not significant enough 
to warrant punishment, that the defendants lacked the requisite mens rea for the violation, or 
worst of all, that substantive regulations of corporate behavior do not actually prohibit stock 
option backdating. Indeed, the legal status of such activity remains opaque, especially with 
regard to federal law. Admittedly, the government has certainly made it clear that it frowns on 
these retroactive grants. Only a foolhardy CEO would engage in this type of behavior in 2009. 
                                                 
164 Cf. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (no private right of action under Securities Act § 12 for 
material misstatement in private communications underlying a transaction that do not fall into the narrow definition 
of a prospectus); TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugs Stores, 
421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that standing under Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is limited to 
actual purchases or sellers of securities); In re Trump Casino Sec. Lit., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that 
narrowly tailored, specific cautionary language can turn projections into non-actionable, immaterial statements); 
Lasker v. N.Y. State & Elec. Gas Corp., 85 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 
336 (2005); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch, 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005). 
165 See Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain About Cost of Corporate Governance Rules, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2004, at A1 (noting Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs of between $ 1 and $ 2 million for 
larger U.S. public companies); see, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Cost Estimates Soar 62% Since January 2004, 
PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 11, 2004, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY 
=/www/story/08-11-2004/0002229830&EDATE=. 
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Yet in light of Samueli, even prudent executives must worry the possibility that a contentious 
exchange with an HR representative in the midst of a legitimate, arms-length negotiation on 
compensation in economically turbulent times may lead to criminal charges at the hands of a 
politically motivated prosecutor five years later.    
Even a far more comprehensive set of disclosure requirements would improve efficiency 
if it could satisfy both the investing public and any enforcement agencies. As is, companies 
spend millions of dollars every year on due diligence associated with reporting standards. They 
then spend at least as much for internal investigations that examine substantially the same 
records, albeit with a different standard of accuracy. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that an 
internal investigation thorough enough to satisfy enforcement bodies would fail to uncover any 
information that the firm compiles through the reporting process. Put another way, the data listed 
in offering memoranda and 10Ks is just a subset of the minimum required for full 
implementation of the current regime. It would be sensible to unify the mandate for the two to 
eliminate duplicative discovery costs.  
 
III.B. A Methodology for Testing Regulation Through the Multilayer Paradigm 
 
The preceding section set out a general theory of regulation. The purpose of this exercise 
was to articulate a set of subject-neutral principles that guide policymakers who promulgate rules 
of conduct. These assumptions can be used to test the value of an entire system of regulation at 
once, identify its weaknesses, and suggest improvements, all without scrutinizing its individual 
components. The Section then applied this technique to securities regulation. It singled out the 
varying standards of materiality contained in obstruction and disclosure jurisprudence as a cause 
for significant inefficiency for actors who usually have to comply with both bodies of law. Such 
overlaps between sets of conflicting substantive rules are characteristic of the flaws of second- 
(and third- through nth-) order regulation. This section will further explore the impact of 
multilayered rules on real enterprises. It will also address several complex obstacles standing in 
the way of expanding the first-order paradigm.  
 
III.B.1. Peeling Onions – Identifying Layers of Regulation in the Real World 
 
Many objections can be leveled against this Article’s claim that adding overlapping 
layers of regulation always has an overadditive effect on compliance costs when compared to 
merely adding identical objectives to a flat regulatory framework. The most important is 
probably the degree of abstraction involved in making the point. Even readers who accept the 
soundness of the logic may worry about its applicability to the real world. The distinction 
between first-order and second-order rules may work on a graph, but how would it hold up in 
Washington, DC?  
Identifying separate layers of corporate law is indeed difficult, but it is important to 
understand what the process does not entail. The proposed evaluation of the regulatory regime 
does not require the construction of a hierarchy of rules. Though such schemes exist (e.g., the 
federalism doctrine or administrative law), they are too rough of a tool for the task. While the 
objectives contained in state law are unlikely to be part of the same “layer” as those in its federal 
counterpart, they may fall into any number of lesser included target subsets. The source of 
authority does not help further pare the latter, whereas a strict focus on federal regulation gives 
the problem a more manageable scope.  
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 The issue then is how one can sort the objectives of, say, the ’34 Act, SOX, and the 
Obama Stimulus Plan into some coherent whole. It is not productive to merely say that the 
current framework consists of several (dozen) layers of overlapping objectives and should be 
flattened, since one needs a vision of what its single-layer equivalent would look like. The last 
goal may not be particularly susceptible to explanation by imagery, but certain functional 
conclusions make it tangible / less opaque. For example, a flat system of rules would permit a 
company to avoid wasting time and money to comply with parallel requests to do largely the 
same thing.  
Moreover, a flat system would allow a rational, well-informed entity to plan a single, 
comprehensive compliance strategy that balances the cost of following each rule with the 
punishment for violating it. Public companies, with their armies of inside and external counsel, 
quality monitors, and compliance experts, are usually actors of this sort. They should be able to 
commit a constant amount of money and staff to an autonomous compliance unit that would 
produce all necessary reports and check for internal violations. In the case of a government 
investigation, this unit should be able to produce all necessary documentation and identify the 
locus of the problem quickly.166 Its members could then advise executives (in the presence of 
their own, personal criminal attorneys) on what information the latter need to provide in order for 
the investigation to reach a particular conclusion. In some situations, this advice would include a 
decision that no violation occurred and the firm should vigorously contest any charges within the 
bounds of the judicial system. In others, given the information already available to this 
compliance unit, turning over likely culprits and admitting responsibility may be most prudent.  
The key feature of this arrangement and others like it is that the firm anticipates its 
informational needs ex ante, plans a process to get this information, and holds the depth of 
inquiry steady across a slate of unanticipated events. Obviously, this is an idealized vision – 
some developments would require further investigation or review of existing records. 
Nonetheless, the nature of the task that a company faces would fundamentally change. Donald 
Rumsfeld’s terminology sheds much light on the transformation.167 Previously, notice of official 
concern about possible misconduct cast the enterprise into a search for unknown unknowns – the 
response was to find data that may or may not have existed describing violations that may or 
may not have occurred. If an internal investigation did not reveal evidence of misconduct, one 
could not determine whether parties were innocent or the investigation itself deficient. Computer 
Associates presented an example of just this kind of dynamic. By contrast, under a single-layer 
disclosure requirement, accusations would lead the firm to examine a known quantity of material 
information. If this set of information did not contain evidence of a violation, one could 
reasonably conclude that such evidence did not exist. The violation may have still occurred, but 
it would have been undocumented and as impervious to investigation as any other cold case.  
 
                                                 
166 This would be like setting up a library that keeps constant track of key publications. Then, users could search the 
library catalog when they need certain information and feel fairly confident that whatever is there does not exist. By 
contrast, the current approach is akin to going to a bookstore or Amazon and trying to buy all relevant books the 
week before a paper is due. The selection that exists is not cataloged appropriately, nor is it a cross-section of 
important publications across time. Instead, it is just a set of pieces that exists.  
167 Hillary Profita, Known Knowns, Known Unknowns And Unknown Unknowns: A Retrospective, CBS NEWS, Nov. 
9, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2006/11/09/publiceye/entry2165872.shtml; Hart Seely, The Poetry of D.H. 
Rumsfeld, SLATE.COM, Apr. 2, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2081042/; see also Richard J. Herring, Essay, The 
Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable in Financial Policy: An Application to the Subprime Crisis, 26 YALE J. 
ON REG. (forthcoming 2009).  
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III.B.2. Other Tell-Tale Signs of Flat Regulatory Structures 
 
Flat regulatory structures carry other operational attributes. For example, they rely on 
consistent terminology within their own boundaries. This operational vocabulary should be 
unique to the greatest extent permitted by natural language. If reasonably distinct from other 
areas of law, this set of key terms will serve to delineate a regulatory arena that focuses primarily 
on certain objectives peculiar to its subject. Practices prevalent in other fields will not 
unintentionally muddle the internal logic of such an arena because their elements will be largely 
distinct. Thus, the federal standard for good decision-making by corporate officers would have to 
rely on concepts unlike those of the states.  
While such an approach may seem to strew confusion, difficulty in formulating a new 
terminology to describe a matter already covered by an existing set of rules would probably deter 
those who care to reinvent the wheel. On the other hand, if an issue has not been dealt with, the 
relevant vocabulary would be up for grabs. Finally, in case a regulatory authority decides to 
promulgate rules governing a space controlled by someone else, the distinct standards would 
offer a clear choice to adjudicators evaluating the merits of one or the other. As such, courts 
would be forced to guess the meaning of ambiguous, overlapping measures to a much lesser 
extent than in the status quo.  
 
Part IV. Evaluating the Compliance Regime through the Multilayer Paradigm 
 
IV.A. Compliance Requirements Generally as Second-Order Regulation 
 
 Recall the discussion of the interaction between substantive disclosure requirements and 
current compliance practice in Part III.A. The dynamic provides the starkest example of 
inefficiencies of a dual-layer regulatory regime and merits further exploration. It is worth noting 
that compliance is not a term of art. It does not appear in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself, and it is 
not defined by any relevant regulations. Instead, compliance is a broad notion that spans several 
distinct but related processes that operate within a public corporation.  
  
 IV.A.1. Damage Control 
 
First, compliance includes activities that companies undertake to mitigate harm from 
substantive violations by their employees or agents. Crucially, these procedures attempt to fix 
any problems created by a known act of misconduct only after this misconduct has been 
discovered by management, a regulator, or some other enforcing agency. Compliance in this 
context includes reviewing transaction records and account ledgers for inaccuracies; identifying 
any gaps in the documentary record created by the perpetrator to hide his activities; finding and 
disciplining any individuals who participated in the misconduct; reviewing and repairing 
financial statements and Exchange Act reports for any inaccuracies stemming from a known 
instance of misconduct; and issuing press releases or media updates necessary to communicate 
the remedial process. All these activities are fundamentally retrospective – they seek to return the 
company to the state in which it would have found itself but for the misconduct.168  
                                                 
168 Removing and / or disciplining any individuals who participated in the misconduct contains both retrospective 
and prospective elements. The activity looks backwards to the extent that it seeks to punish deviation from company 
rules of conduct. It looks forward in aiming to prevent future violations of a similar sort by removing or debilitating 
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IV.A.2. Internal Controls – Prevention and Record-Keeping 
 
Second, compliance involves the implementation of the managerial and data-collection 
apparati required by SOX §§ 302, 404, and associated regulations.169 As discussed in Part I.B, 
SOX § 302 requires officers of a reporting company to establish and certify the quality of 
internal controls over financial reporting that are supposed to ensure that material information 
about the issuer gets to the correct individuals.170 Section 404 then elaborates on this 
command.171 Regulatory guidance for auditors explains that to satisfy the statute, an appropriate 
compliance program would include robust devices designed to identify any fraudulent 
transactions, such as controls over significant managerial estimates or internal transfers.172 SEC 
Releases that provide managerial instructions on the matter generally concur with the accounting 
rules. The Commission, however, emphasizes record-keeping, both for actual screening of 
decisions that carry a significant risk of generating a material misstatement and for 
documentation proving that the compliance system works overall.173  
                                                                                                                                                             
the most likely perpetrators. This blend, however, is characteristic of most punitive sanctions, including those in the 
criminal law. When examined with the rest of the mitigation steps, the employee penalties look primarily 
retroactive, especially when contrasted with the other types of compliance activity.  
169 See Part I.B, supra; 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241(a)(4)(B), 7262 (2006); Final Rule: Management's Report on Internal 
Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act 
Release No. 47,986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (Aug. 14, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.html, 
[hereinafter Release No. 34-47,986].  
170 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241(a)(4)(B) (2006) (“the signing officers . . . are responsible for establishing and maintaining 
internal controls”).  
171 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006). 
172 See, e.g., PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, AUDITING STANDARD NO. 5 – AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL 
CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING THAT IS INTEGRATED WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND 
RELATED INDEPENDENCE RULE AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS, Release 2007-005 at 7, A1-9 (Par. 14, 15) (2007), 
available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_021/2007-05-24_Release_No_2007-005.pdf. 
173 Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting Under 
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 55,929, 77 Fed. Reg. 
35,324, at 35,337-35,348 (June 27, 2007); Release No. 34-47,986, supra note 164. Release No. 34-47,986 defines 
“internal Control  over financial reporting” as:  
 A process designed by, or under the supervision of, the registrant's principal executive 
and principal financial officers, or persons performing similar functions, and effected by the 
registrant's board of directors,50 management and other personnel, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements 
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and includes 
those policies and procedures that:  
 
(1) Pertain to the maintenance of records that in reasonable detail accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the registrant;  
 
(2) Provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation 
of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that 
receipts and expenditures of the registrant are being made only in accordance with authorizations 
of management and directors of the registrant; and  
 
(3) Provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized 
acquisition, use or disposition of the registrant's assets that could have a material effect on the 
financial statements. 
Id.  
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In practice, internal control systems store most copies of employee electronic 
communications, automatically check certain allocations, and flag suspect transactions for 
review.174 In addition to the automated functions, compliance policies of this sort may feature 
complex managerial rules and employee regulations.175 Both the SEC and PCAOB favor a mix 
of human and computerized controls, and a heterogeneous approach makes sense in light of 
technological constraints (machines are far inferior to people when it comes to identifying 
distressed or lying workers). Accordingly, these systems may involve layers of supervision for 
certain departments, often by parallel bodies. Anonymous tipping systems set up to encourage 
and protect whistleblowers would also logically fall into this category of enterprise behavior. 
These may include mandatory up-the-ladder reporting requirements akin to those targeting 
attorneys in Section 307 of SOX.176 Overall, the focus of the second type of compliance 
behaviors is proactive – they ferret out irregularities and try to prevent fraud before it happens. 
By doing so, the programs shape the overall information environment of the enterprise by 
collecting and organizing key data. They thus lay the foundation for the third type of compliance 
behavior.  
 
 IV.A.3. Internal Investigations.  
 
Even with the two types of systems described above firmly in place, firms often have to 
undertake emergency action to deal with tips about potential misconduct that come from either 
concerned regulators or private whistleblowers. The corporate response usually takes the shape 
of an extensive internal investigation where either a high-level manager or outside counsel 
review records, interview employees, and compile a report detailing their findings. Both 
statutory and practical concerns motivate this behavior.177 Pursuant to SOX § 301, the Board is 
obligated to follow up on the receipt of any allegations of material misconduct.178 Practically, 
even with the advent of the McNulty Memorandum, internal investigations are a key element of 
cooperative behavior with the government.179 Failure to undertake them or turn over results to 
the government often threatens the firm with dissolution through indictment, or, at best, severe 
monetary penalties.180 
 
IV.B. Contextualizing the Impact of Compliance Practices 
 
While the three types of compliance are each reasonable responses to different kinds of 
pressure in their own right, they interact to form several noxious effects. Internal Control systems 
usually maintain permanent records of most workplace communications and decisions.181 At the 
                                                 
174 See, e.g., Andrew R. Lee, Keep or Toss? Document Retention Policies in the Digital Era, 55 LA Bar J. 240, 246-
47 (Dec. 07 / Jan. 08).  
175 Id.   
176 See SOX § 305, 17 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2008).  
177 See Lee, supra note 173.  
178 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4) (2006).  
179 See O’Sullivan, supra note 112.  
180 See id.  
181 See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Lee, supra note 173, at 241-242; 
Fran Howarth, Emails That Come Back to Haunt: Deleted? May Be Not …, THE REGISTER, Apr. 26, 2004, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/04/26/email_data_retention/; Jesselyn Radack, I Learned the Hard Way that E-
Mails Are Forever: They Never Really “Disappear,” DAILYKOS.COM, Apr. 12, 2007, at 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/4/12/54612/8770; Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern 
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same time, such systems set up channels for anonymous complaints and encourage employees to 
report suspicious behavior. They often supplement the latter prong with an up-the-ladder 
provision that requires managers in receipt of complaints to forward them on to ostensibly less 
partial higher ups. Meanwhile, pragmatic managers and competent legal advisors understand that 
failure to investigate an allegation in good faith could prove extremely damaging if later 
uncovered by the authorities; indeed, beyond merely suggesting that a company is not 
cooperating, it can lead to obstruction charges against the firm and its executives.  
The existence of compliance systems generates further troublesome path-dependent 
corporate behavior. In a sufficiently complex enterprise, employees routinely have to make 
complicated decisions based on imperfect or incomplete information. This context means that 
frequently, a good choice is not obviously correct and a bad choice is not obviously wrong. 
Many options may seem equally worthwhile. The Business Judgment Rule discussed in Part I.A 
insulates the behavior of managers and directors from excessive ex post scrutiny by shareholders 
for this very reason. Problematically, compliance systems may do quite the opposite, 
exaggerating errors and even creating illusory violations.  
 
IV.B.I. A Reasonable Example of a Difficult Decision 
 
Consider Adam, a worker who has to make a difficult decision about the percentage of a 
loan portfolio that will become uncollectible and must be written off. Suppose further that this 
“bad loan share” is a crucial metric for comparing the company to its competitors and that Adam 
gets a bonus every year that varies in proportion to it. Adam, however, works closely on 
managing the portfolio with Barbara, a member of the tax planning office tasked with 
minimizing taxable corporate income. From Barbara’s perspective, larger bad loan estimates 
create legitimate amortization deductions if they are accurate and improve free cash flow for the 
company. Of course, Barbara recognizes that excess deductions may lead to future tax liabilities. 
Since the company is under continuous IRS audit, however, the danger from overstating these is 
relatively small. As long as the deductions do not venture into the clearly abusive territory, the 
company will simply have to reimburse the Service for the challenged item. 
After a volatile Q4 2008, Adam and Barbara both attempt to value their loan portfolio. 
Adam is reasonably optimistic and believes the company’s customers have weathered the worst 
of the financial storm. They cut inefficient side business, trimmed their workforce, and decreased 
their debt-to-equity ratios. In his experience, these steps mean that the proportion of borrowers 
defaulting on their loan should decrease compared to previous year. Barbara, on the other hand, 
sees these same decisions as symptoms of an increasingly severe economic contraction that will 
drastically reduce the debtors’ revenue and free cash flow. These developments would make it 
difficult for companies to pay back existing obligations at the very time when future profits and 
the concomitant incentive to stay in business begin to diminish. Barbara believes that the 
company should prudently recognize the incoming storm and attempt to minimize tax 
expenditures. Unfortunately, the staff economists at work have been too busy dealing with 
internal viability forecasts to provide detailed advice to the managers.  
With all of the above facts in mind, Adam proposes a 5% loan write-off. Barbara 
responds that 20% is the more reasonable amount. Following a series of increasingly heated 
                                                                                                                                                             
District of New York, Two Senior Managers of Bear Stearns Hedge Funds Indicted on Conspiracy and Fraud 
Charges (June 19, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nye/pr/2008/2008jun19.html (referencing email 
communications between the individuals and their colleagues from several prior years).  
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phone calls and email exchanges, Adam takes a deep breath and acknowledges that Barbara’s 
figure is probably more accurate – she has been working at the company longer and has a 
master’s degree in finance. Moreover, the resounding messages of impending doom in the media 
make any optimistic projections seem at best naïve, and at worst misguided; after all, seemingly 
healthy companies are falling apart like decks of cards for increasingly complex reasons. Adam’s 
calculations support his estimate, but he figures some implicit, outdated assumption in his model 
drives the currently erroneous conclusion. The two settle on 15% as the projected amortization of 
the loan portfolio.  
 
IV.B.II. How Compliance Systems Turn the Business Judgment Rule Inside Out 
 
The above behavior is innocuous; indeed, both Adam and Barbara appear to be model 
employees: thoughtful, diligent, dedicated, willing to change their minds. Unfortunately, the 
compliance regime distorts these characteristics into far more nefarious traits. If neither Barbara 
nor Adam was exactly correct and total defaults rose to 20%, records of their discussion 
collected by the ICFR system would look like an intentional disregard of the correct estimate. 
Certainly, some of Adam’s concerns will also be reflected in the correspondence trail, but so 
would the parameters of his decision – a contingent bonus and ongoing pressure to outperform 
competitors in the short term. Moreover, from the perspective of future observers, the two 
employees may have disregarded instructions in the company manual to report material disputes 
to their respective supervisors. Both would probably argue that, in a time of rolling layoffs, they 
feared bothering their boss with mundane matters that could be interpreted as incompetence, but 
the transgression may be enough to initiate a firm-wide investigation into similar practices as an 
insurance policy against future prosecutions.  
An alarming twist arises out of the result of this investigation. Even if management 
uncovers no wrongdoing at all, they will compile a report detailing what appear to be a set of 
reasonable disagreements on hard questions. The company will then store this document 
indefinitely. If at some point in the future a young, politically-motivated U.S. Attorney decides to 
examine possible fraud at an enterprise teetering on the brink of collapse after receiving billions 
of dollars in federal aid and wiping out as much in shareholder value, management will be put to 
an uncomfortable decision. They could either withhold prior reports identifying and exculpating 
instances of suspicious behavior from the prosecutor and risk an obstruction charge a la 
Computer Associates, or turn the documents over and play into to the previously unfounded 
charges.  
As illustrated above, the combination of obstruction of justice statutes with practical and 
legal compliance requirements essentially turns the traditional Business Judgment Rule inside 
out by encouraging enforcement agents to second-guess managerial decisions. In this 
environment, an employee who changes his mind under adverse circumstances lays the 
foundation for a crime even in the absence of any guilty mens rea. Rather, a system that 
accumulates an ongoing record of these actions without simultaneously tracking the entirety of 
the circumstances creates a fertile ground for politically-minded prosecutions later on. Routine 
deviations from industry practices that do not receive an official reprimand begin to look like 
low-level fraud, or, more likely, a managerial dereliction of duty. Mistakes that do set off the hair 
trigger for some degree of internal investigation but lead to an exculpatory conclusion are far 
worse – they create the image of an intentional cover-up by executives who allegedly looked the 
other way when things were going awry on the shop floor.  
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IV.B.III. Enforcement Raids and Fishing Expeditions 
 
Since multiple parties are aware of the existence of a mass of potentially damaging 
information within corporate records, the extant compliance posture encourages fishing 
expeditions. Disgruntled employees can handicap the careers of their superiors or competitors at 
nearly zero cost by anonymously alleging misconduct by these individuals. Within most robust 
internal controls systems, these tips trigger internal investigations that can be ruinous for workers 
and very costly for the enterprise, both from a monetary and a reputational perspective. Indeed, if 
these internal investigations yield nothing of note, as would be expected from a wild goose 
chase, they can still put the company in peril at a later, official confrontation by suggesting that 
the managers did not look hard enough. Worse yet is the possibility that the executives uncover 
some behavior that looks suspicious and happens to roughly match the anonymous allegations, 
but, unbeknownst to organizers is actually innocuous. In this situation, the company is likely to 
discipline productive employees for being more successful at their jobs than the lazy, disgruntled 
ones, all because of an overwhelming desire to preserve an innocent, scrupulous image for any 
potential conversation with government officials in the future.  
In fact, inserting a government official in place of the anonymous private tipster who 
sends out false alarms to carry out private vendettas yields an even grimmer outcome. If an 
agency voices concern over potential violations within a firm and asks the target to carry out an 
internal investigation and turn over the results, the costs to the enterprise remain somewhat 
constant. The company has to pay for outside counsel, managers have to focus their work on 
looking for ethereal culprits, transaction costs for the business generally go up. Shareholders take 
an additional hit due to reputational consequences that are likely to depress the stock price. In 
one area, however, the firm bears a lot more damage. Here, if the allegations happen to match a 
record of actual behavior, the costs to the target will not be capped at merely firing a good 
worker while potentially holding on to a bad one. Instead, the coincidence will start in motion a 
much harsher legal process, since now the enforcement authority will have evidence to match its 
theory of guilt.  
Curiously, a company would fare better in such a situation if the prosecutor initially 
embarked on the fishing expedition with the express motive to boost his status, rather than due to 
a misguided suspicion of genuine violations. The former would likely have a better strategic 
understanding of the internal dynamics the company faces within the compliance regime. He 
would be unlikely to assume that the match in question by itself signifies the presence of 
genuinely harmful conduct. As such, he would extract political rents from the firm only up to the 
point where the damage his actions cause to the entity (by destroying jobs, eroding the local tax 
base, and hurting shareholders) begin to outweigh the benefit to his reputation for being tough on 
crime. By contrast, the righteous but paranoid government investigator would be less likely to 
look at the newly conforming data skeptically. His goals would be to genuinely clean house in 
the target company. Since, by hypothesis, no real violation occurred (recall that the matching 
conduct is innocent but suspicious), the prosecutor would lack a natural endpoint to his demand. 
After all, the individuals he is likely to blame are no more culpable than their officemates. 
Moreover, any company-wide program that he requests to prevent future violations would by 
definition constitute deadweight loss on society – these safety measures would be no better at 
preventing a nonexistent violation from taking place than the previous ones.  
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 IV.C. The Specific Harms of the Compliance Regime 
 
Of course, U.S. Attorneys or SEC lawyers can go on fishing expeditions in the absence of 
internal control systems. Likewise, frustrated employees can attempt to sabotage their 
supervisors’ careers without using tipping hotlines established by the company – an unsigned 
letter slipped under the CFO’s door would do as much. As previously mentioned, however, the 
compliance regime generally acts as a catalyst that amplifies properties of the original substance 
almost beyond recognition.  
If a private party makes a complaint in the absence of an anonymous whistleblower 
system, two things can happen. First, the recipient can take heed of the allegations and check 
them in good faith. If he finds nothing, he would be under no responsibility to save the results of 
his investigation for posterity.182 If misconduct did take place, the officer can punish the 
perpetrator, document the behavior, and move on. In the second state of the world, the recipient 
of the allegations would ignore them, again in good faith – perhaps because he knows that the 
harsh economic climate has caused widespread employee discontent or because he has recently 
carried out a comprehensive survey of the operations in question. In the absence of an internal 
controls system that requires up-the-ladder reporting and documents the overwhelming majority 
of corporate communications, the decision to do nothing based on the allegations would benefit 
from the veil of the Business Judgment Rule. Once the above mechanisms are in place, however, 
failure to take action begins to look like obstruction from the viewpoint of future investigators.  
With respect to government authorities, the impact of the compliance-obstruction mix is 
even more potent. Human beings maintain a relatively steady accuracy rate in a given task across 
time, with each person carrying their own intrinsic rate of error.183 Training improves the 
performance for most individuals; time pressure and fatigue worsens it.184 While empirical work 
on these findings has focused primarily on elementary tasks, its lessons should naturally apply to 
the office environment. That is, for any given position and degree of experience, employees will 
make mistakes with some constant frequency x (that is, x times out of 100, they will fail to 
perform their assigned job correctly). Sometimes the errors will be involuntary; other times they 
will be malicious. The point, however, is that, for present purposes, one can expect to have a 
steady flow of both types of results.  
When a company implements a new, more comprehensive system of internal controls and 
records, it should generally document a greater number of infractions than management 
previously detected.185 At the same time, unless the firm is generally committed to 
                                                 
182 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) ("a conscious decision to refrain from acting may 
nonetheless be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy the protections of the rule.").  
183 See, e.g., David E. Kieras & David E. Meyer, The Role of Cognitive Task Analysis in the Application of 
Predictive Models of Human Perfomance, in COGNITIVE TASK ANALYSIS 237-60 (J. M. Schraagen, S. F. Chipman, 
& V. L. Shalin, eds.,  2000); David E. Meyer & David E. Kieras, A Computational Theory of Executive Cognitive 
Processes and Multiple-Task Performance: Part 1, Basic Mechanisms, 104 PSYCHOL. REV. 3 (1997); Joshua S. 
Rubinstein, David E. Meyer & Jeffrey E. Evans, Executive Control of Cognitive Processes in Task Switching, 27 J. 
OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 763 (2001).   
184 See Kieras & Meyer, supra.  
185 Conceivably, employees can begin to concentrate harder on their work when they know their performance is 
being monitored more accurately, thereby decreasing the rate of errors. Such behavior seems unlikely, however, 
unless the increased probability of detection also entails an increased probability of punishment. A robust 
compliance system guarantees the former, but not the latter. It will record a lot more information, thereby capturing 
evidence of faulty performance, but any interpretation of this data stream will still have to be made by human 
beings.  
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revolutionizing its culture, supervisors are unlikely to pursue a significantly greater number of 
the violations than before. Managerial resources (number of available people and their time) are 
fixed in the short term and the firm is unlikely to want to contribute an increased share of these 
to discipline. This is especially so when the stated purpose of most compliance systems is to 
decrease the amount of time spent on remedying non-material infractions by efficiently 
identifying those instances of conduct that deserve attention. Intuitively, this latter type of 
behavior must fall or stay the same, not go up; its share of total infractions should also stay 
constant. However, the gross number of detected employee violations should go up due to 
greater systemic sensitivity as a whole. In turn, this means that rational managers will 
intentionally ignore or unintentionally avoid knowledge of a larger number of mistakes by their 
teams.  
All the transgressions will remain on the record, however. Indeed, with the aid of the first 
two types of compliance apparati, they will multiply. Some of the items the new system detects 
will actually merit internal investigations, which are as prone to errors as any other processes. 
The review of employee misconduct will thus lead to the creation of more instances of 
misconduct simply because the review itself constitutes work that would not have existed 
otherwise.186 As pointed out above, both accidental and intentional infractions are the 
unavoidable product of the combination of human fallibility and work.   
The easily accessible, searchable records of all these violations generate fodder for 
unscrupulous enforcement officials. Before the advent of comprehensive compliance systems, 
government investigators could allege misconduct and force a company to turn over some finite 
amount of data. Alternatively, the authorities could request that the target carry out an internal 
investigation and return the results. In either case, investigators received a limited amount of 
material from which they could build conforming evidence in fishing expeditions. The 
proliferation of internal control systems with up-the-ladder requirements, anonymous tip 
hotlines, and obligatory “key point” review has increased this amount of raw material by an 
order of magnitude while simultaneously making it easier to search. As argued above, these 
changes have actually generated a greater gross number of violations. Any one of these can 
provide fuel for a damaging prosecution. Enforcement officials rarely seem to care and almost 
never measure the rate of violations within an enterprise,187 focusing instead on their absolute 
number. By doing so, they essentially create a secondary tax on compliance, further raising the 




To be clear, the above consequences stem neither from the existence of compliance 
programs broadly, internal control systems particularly, or even obstruction statutes alone. 
Political turbulence and alternating business cycles catalyze the mix into its present form. The 
latter ingredients, however, are ever-present in the status quo. A regulatory system looking to 
                                                 
186 It is reasonable to assume that firms will staff their most competent workers on internal review matters. While the 
intrinsic error rate of these individuals is likely to be significantly lower than that of the average employee, they will 
still make some mistakes.  
187 See Amitai Aviram, Counter-Cyclical Enforcement of Corporate Law, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2008); cf. Macey & 
O’Hara, supra note 27, at 109. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen 
Different? An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 263 (2004) (showing that the rate of financial restatement by Arthur Andresen clients did not differ 
significantly from the rate of restatement for clients of the other Big 5 accounting firms).  
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optimize economic performance while honoring retributive justice concerns must take them into 
account.  
Arguably, eliminating prosecutorial discretion would also go a long way in reducing the 
efficiency costs of the compliance regime. If enforcement agents who brought charges of 
obstruction had to commit to litigating them before a judge, they would be less likely to allege 
such violations for political gain or due to earnest but paranoid desires for corporate discipline. 
Moreover, if the number of bench trials for obstruction skyrocketed, one could reasonably expect 
the standards of disclosure and good faith behavior for reporting companies to converge, simply 
because good jurists would recognize that both issues examine the same general set of enterprise 
behavior.  
Prosecutorial discretion is not going anywhere any time soon, however, at least not in the 
United States and especially not at the federal level. Efficiency-minded policymakers thus need 
to find a different solution to excessive corporate compliance costs. A systematic eradication of 
multi-layer regulations offers one alternative. In a structure of flat rules, firms would have a lot 
more freedom to optimize their performance while still operating within the constraints of social 
morality. The next best approach would be to explicitly encourage judges and other adjudicators 
to interpret overlapping regulatory decrees as specific objectives, not general principles, thereby 
preserving maximal room for unfettered corporate creativity. At a minimum, Congress and 
administrative agencies need to clearly spell out their preferred criteria for integration to end the 
secondary efficiency toll that currently comes from uncertainty. This change would permit 
interpreters to use a more restrictive method of interpretation as a default while honoring the 
regulator’s intent to preserve freedom of action in cases that feature the appropriate instruction.  
If either the first or the second recommendation came into fruition, companies would no 
longer face the threat of dissolution for assuming a defense posture in response to allegations. 
Rather, they would be able to confidently point to the required periodic reports and auditor 
memoranda as fulfilling their disclosure obligation to the government. That is, potential 
defendants would be able to legitimately argue that the authorities are not entitled to any 
information beyond that which the companies already put forward into the public sphere to build 
their case. Of course, even a perfectly flat regulatory structure would not immunize individual 
perpetrators within the firm, who would still face the choice between cooperating with the 
government for reduced sentences and gambling on a criminal trial. Moreover, the substantive 
aspect of obstruction violations would remain: enterprises would not be entitled to knowingly 
destroy records or affirmatively interfere with officials’ efforts to construct a case out of publicly 
available information. Given the above dynamics, politically minded enforcement agents would 
be far less likely to attempt fishing raids on large enterprises, since they would have far fewer 
chances to get a fortuitous match.  
There is no shortage of calls for regulatory reform at this time. Pundits from both sides of 
the political spectrum have proposed a variety of new constraints on the behavior of corporations 
and their employees in an effort to tame “runaway greed and excess speculation.” While many of 
these ideas are the worst examples of reactionary populism, some doubtless have merit. Yet 
when evaluating their worth, policymakers must consider their impact in the context of the 
existing regulatory regime as a whole. This Article seeks to establish a new paradigm for such 
examination (multilayer regulation) and point towards one direction where close scrutiny may be 
particularly important (the interaction of obstruction and compliance regimes). 
